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ARTICLES
WHEN THE STATE STEALS IDEAS: IS THE
ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL INFRINGEMENT
CLAIMS CONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF
SEMINOLE TRIBE?
Christina Bohannan*
& Thomas F. Cotter**
INTRODUCTION

H

ISTORY is replete with legendary accounts of the ruler who, in
Jan effort to preclude a master builder from ever equaling or surpassing some glorious feat commissioned by the sovereign, employs a
rather crude substitute for the modem covenant not to compete.'
One of the more popular stories, for example, is that upon completion
of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow, Czar Ivan IV (the Terrible) ordered the blinding of the architect who designed that work.2 In a similar vein, the seventeenth-century Mogul Emperor Shah Jahan, who
commissioned the Taj Mahal as a memorial to his wife, is reputed to
have ordered either the murder or the blinding of his architect, as well
as the mutilation of some of the other artisans who participated in the
construction.' And it is written that the city fathers of medieval Strasbourg, fearing that the artist who had designed an earlier version of
the town cathedral's astonishing astronomical clock might create a
* Clerk, Hon. Edward E. Carnes, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1998-99 Term.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. We vish to
thank Paul J. Heald, Paul S. Horwitz, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Amy R. Mashburn,
James C. Nicholas, Richard H. Stem, Mary P. Twitchell, and H.S. Udaykumar for
their comments and criticism, and Kenneth Eckstein for his research assistance. Any
errors that remain are ours.
1. A covenant not to compete with one's former employer "may be justified as a
reasonable attempt to protect confidential information, provided that the duration
and geographic scope of the covenant are appropriately related to the promisee's legitimate interests." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 41 cmt. d (1995).
2. See, eg., Henri Troyat, Ivan the Terrible 75 n.* (Joan Pinkham trans., E.P.
Dutton, Inc. 1984) (1982) (recounting the legend). But see Robert Payne & Nikita
Romanoff, Ivan the Terrible 176 (1975) (asserting that story "is certainly untrue").
3. See David Carroll, The Taj Mahal 56 (1972) (recounting the legend that the
architect was killed and other workers were blinded or mutilated, but noting that "[i]n
reality we know almost nothing about the architect who designed the Taj Mahal and
little of the men who raised it"); Brian Jackman, Love and Romance in a Tiger's
Tracks, Daily Mail, July 9, 1994, at 60 (claiming that the architect was blinded).
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similar clock elsewhere, had him blinded too.4 The designer took his
revenge, however, when, having been granted permission to examine
the clock one last time before the execution of sentence, he made sure
to gum up the clockworks in such a way that neither he, after being
blinded, nor anyone else could ever get the chimes to work properly
again.5
However questionable their judgments otherwise might be from
time to time, by and large the rulers of modern states no longer employ measures as extreme as these (assuming that they ever really did)
in their relationships with artists, inventors, and other creative people.6 In the United States in particular, about the worst thing any governing body ever does to an artist or inventor-aside from subjecting
her to the occasional brush with censorshipT-is to refuse to pay for
the use of her creations. And while this practice may seem relatively
benign in comparison with, say, the alleged activities of an Ivan IV or
a Shah Jahan, by the early 1990s the risk of nonpayment was viewed as
enough of a threat to the well-being of artists and inventors that Congress was moved to enact legislation-which we shall refer to hereafter as the Remedy Clarification Acts-rendering state governments
amenable to suit in federal court for violations of the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts (the latter being a federal statute that regulates trademarks). 8 Although the federal government had waived its
own immunity from some suits of this nature years before,9 by the late
1980s it was becoming apparent that no similar waiver existed with
respect to the states"0 and that this omission could make it very diffi4. See Wilhelm Ruland, Legends of the Rhine 57-59 (Andrew Mitchell & H.J.
Findlay trans. 1906). We thank Professor Francis McCoy for bringing this story to our
attention.
5. See id. at 59.
6. Well, at least some of them don't. There's this fellow Salman Rushdie, for
example ....
7. That threat, however, should not be understated. See, e.g., Alabama Grand
Jury Indicts Barnes & Noble, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1998, at A10 (discussing recent
indictments of a bookseller in Alabama and Tennessee for selling works by photographers Jock Sturges and David Hamilton). Another occasional problem is the modification or destruction of works of public art, which may give rise to a violation of the
artist's "moral rights." See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 638 (S.D.
Ind. 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of an artist on his claim that the city
violated his moral right of integrity by destroying his sculpture); see also infra notes
54-58 and accompanying text (discussing moral rights).
8. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541 (a)-(b), 2570 (1994) and 35
U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994)); Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127
(1994)); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511, 901(a), 911(g) (1994)).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)-(b) (1994) (authorizing awards of "reasonable and
entire compensation" for uses by federal government of patents and copyrights).
10. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 5-6 (1992) (discussing patent and trademark
cases in which states were found to be immune), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
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cult for owners to control the use of their intellectual property by university and other state employees."

In attempting to abrogate the states' immunity from infringement
suits, however, Congress had to wind its way carefully through the

various obstacles thrown up by modem Eleventh Amendment law.
Although the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

asserts simply that "[tihe Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit ...

commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,""2 over
the years the United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions
bordering on the whimsical, has interpreted the amendment as
prohibiting most claims against the states in federal court, regardless
of the plaintiff's citizenship.' 3 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,14 however, the
Court held that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when enacting legislation to enforce section I of that amendment against the states," and in
the 1989 case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' 6 five justices agreed

that this abrogation authority extended to at least some legislation enacted pursuant to the Article I power to regulate interstate commerce. 17 Congress took the hint and specifically stated, in the House

and Senate Reports accompanying the Remedy Clarification Acts,
that it was abrogating state immunity pursuant to its powers under
Article I and (with respect to the Patent and Trademark Remedy
Clarification Acts only) under the Fourteenth Amendment.18
3091-92; H. Rep. No. 101-282(I), at 2 & n.6 (1990) (collecting copyright cases), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3950.
11. See S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 8-9 (arguing that state universities would have an
advantage over private universities if the former were immune from patent infringement suits), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094-95; H. Rep. No. 101-282(I), at
8-9 (noting the potential for abuses on the part of state entities with respect to products such as books and software), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3956-57.
12. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
13. See infra notes 90-139 and accompanying text.
14. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
15. See id at 456. In relevant part, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 states that "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.
16. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
17. Writing for himself and three other justices, Justice Brennan concluded that
"to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they
also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this
authority, to render them liable." Id. at 19-20. Concurring in the judgment, Justice
White wrote that, while he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion "that Congress
has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
the States," he did "not agree with much of [Brennan's] reasoning." Id. at 57 (White,
J., concurring).
18. See S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992) (stating that the patent amendments
were "justified under the Patent Clause, the Commerce Clause and the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that trademark amendments were
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Congress's plan appeared to be working, more or less,19 until 1996,
when the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida20 overruled
Union Gas, holding that Congress does not have the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when enacting legislation pursuant to
Article 1.21 Because Article I provides the more obvious basis for enacting the Remedy Clarification Acts (inasmuch as it contains both
the Patent and Copyright Clause 22 and the Commerce Clause, 23 the
latter of which serves as the source of the Lanham Act),24 the Seminole Tribe decision renders the Remedy Clarification Acts constitutionally suspect. The question therefore arises whether these or
similar acts could be sustained on the basis of Congress's remaining
power to abrogate immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In this Article, we consider two possible theories under which the
Remedy Clarification Acts might be sustained as an exercise of Congress's power under section 5. The first is based upon the argument
that, when a state infringes intellectual property, it effects a taking for
a public purpose for which just compensation is due under the Fifth
Amendment, as made applicable against the states under section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5 The second is based upon the argument that, when the state infringes intellectual property, it deprives
the owner of property without due process of law.2 6 If either theory is
"justified under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment"), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94; H.R. Rep. No. 101-282(I), at 7 (1990) (explicitly
stating that Congress intended to effect abrogation of immunity from copyright liability pursuant to the Copyright Clause, and noting that Congress's power to abrogate
under the Fourteenth Amendment had been "repeatedly upheld"), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3955.
19. See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 939-49 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that a state university was not immune from suit in federal court, where
plaintiff sought a declaration that university's patent was invalid and had been obtained through fraud); Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F.
Supp. 790, 802 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a state university was not immune from suit
in federal court, with respect to alleged acts of trademark and copyright infringement
occurring after effective date of Remedy Clarification Acts); cf. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding Congress's power to waive
sovereign immunity under Copyright and Trademark Clarification Acts, but only with
respect to cases in which states "opt to conduct business for profit in areas where
Congress conditions participation upon waiver of immunity"), vacated sub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996).
20. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
21. See id. at 66.
22. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries").
23. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have power "[tjo regulate
Commerce ... among the several States").
24. See S. Rep. No. 1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
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correct, then Congress's decision to render the states amenable to suit
in federal court for violations of the federal intellectual property laws
can be viewed as an effort to enforce section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In part I, we provide some further background information on intellectual property law in general, the Eleventh Amend27. Thus far, these theories have been tested in three reported cases. In Chavez v.
Arte PublicoPress, 157 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, a public university, had violated the Copyright Act by publishing her book without her consent, and also that the defendant had violated the Lanham Act by
asserting, without her permission, that she had selected plays for another book published by the university. See id. at 284-85. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit in federal court. See id. at 291. The court reasoned first that
Seminole Tribe essentially overruled the Eleventh Amendment constructive consent
doctrine, discussed infra at notes 119-28 and accompanying text. See Chavez, 157 F.3d
at 285-87. Second, the court determined that the alleged acts did not implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 287-91. Judge Wisdom dissented, concluding that
Congress had validly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 296-98.
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Erpense
Board, 948 F. Supp. 400 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149), and affd, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531), the plaintiff
filed two complaints, one alleging that a state body charged with administering a tuition prepayment program had infringed the plaintiff's patented investment method,
and the other alleging that the state body had violated section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), by making material misrepresentations in connection
with its program. See id. at 401-02. The court denied a motion to dismiss the patent
claim, concluding that Congress had properly abrogated immunity from patent claims
pursuant to its power, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to render states "amenable
to suit in federal court for allegedly depriving patentees of their patent property without compensation and without due process of law." Id. at 425-26. The court granted a
motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claim, however, reasoning that Congress could not
abrogate immunity from false advertising claims because the right to be free from
false advertising is not a property interest. See id. at 426-28. The plaintiff appealed the
dismissal of the false advertising claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 356 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan.
8,1999) (No. 98-149). The Third Circuit affirmed, but noted that it was not addressing
the issue of whether the Trademark Clarification Act would be constitutional as applied to claims for trademark infringement. See id. at 361-62. The defendant appealed
the denial of its motion to dismiss the patent claim to the Federal Circuit; that court
also affirmed. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1999) (No. 98-531).
Finally, in Genented, Inc v. Regents of the University of California,939 F. Supp.
639 (S.D. Ind. 1996), the court held that an action for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity could not be sustained on the basis of the due process theory, because
the plaintiff did not have a property right that had been deprived without due process;
the court suggested, however, that if the plaintiff were the patentee and were suing for
infringement, "the Fourteenth Amendment would provide Congress with the power
necessary to abrogate UC's immunity." Id. at 643-44. The Federal Circuit recently
reversed this holding, however, on the ground that UC had impliedly waived its immunity from suit in federal court "by its charge of patent infringement [against
Genentech] and threat of federally imposed and enforced remedial action."
Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
petition for cert filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731).
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ment, and the Remedy Clarification Acts. In part II, we consider the
takings argument and in part III the due process argument. We conclude that, notwithstanding its superficial appeal, the takings theory is
defective in several material respects; and that, while the due process
argument fares somewhat better, it too fails to provide a rationale for
subjecting the states to comprehensive liability in the manner contemplated by the Remedy Clarification Acts. As a consequence, we believe that, under existing law, the acts are unconstitutional; and, as
discussed in part IV, that there is little more that can be done to compel the states to submit to the jurisdiction of the federal district courts
with respect to claims falling outside that range.

I. BACKGROUND
In this part, we provide the background information necessary for
evaluating whether the Remedy Clarification Acts can be justified as
an exercise of Congress's power to abrogate sovereign immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the first section, we briefly explain the nature of the rights these acts attempt to shield from state
encroachment. We then provide a brief summary of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence and the Remedy Clarification Acts.
A.

Intellectual Property

In this section, we discuss the rights afforded intellectual property
under federal law. We begin with a summary of rights in inventions
under federal patent law. We then examine rights in works of authorship under the Copyright Act and conclude with a brief discussion of
the law of trademarks, false advertising, and product disparagement.
1. Patents
The law of patents2 8 affords the patentee a right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling her invention in the United States2 9 for
a term ending twenty years from the date on which the patent application was filed.30 To qualify for a patent, an invention must be novel, 31
A district court in Texas also recently held, in light of Seminole Tribe, that Article I
does not authorize Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity from copyright claims.
See Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 881 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
The case does not address the issue, however, of whether Congress may abrogate
immunity from these claims when enacting legislation pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
28. Although the text above focuses upon utility patents, many of the same principles also apply to plant and design patents. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994) (Plant
Variety Protection Act); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1994) (Plant Patent Act); id. §§ 171-73
(design patents). The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
purports to abrogate immunity from claims arising from the use of any of these patents. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541; 35 U.S.C. § 296(a).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994); 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1998).
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a).
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useful,32 and non-obvious, 3 and the application must disclose certain
specified information.34 The federal district courts enjoy exclusive

subject matter jurisdiction over claims for patent infringement 35 and
may enjoin the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of the patented

invention.3 6 They also may award "damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement,"37 including an award of lost profits attributable
to the infringement or lost royalties. 3 1 Finally, the court has the au-

thority to "increase the damages up to three times the amount found

or assessed" 39 and (in "exceptional cases" only) to award attorney's
fees to the prevailing party.4° In general, however, a court will award
enhanced damages and fees only in cases of willful infringement or

bad faith litigation. 4 '

2. Copyright
A second form of intellectual property protection, copyright, inheres in "works of authorship"-things such as literary works, musical
compositions, and motion pictures 42-that are "original '4 3 and
31. In general, the novelty requirement is satisfied if the patent applicant was the
first to invent the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth conditions
under which an invention is considered novel); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1585, 1593-94 & n.32 (1998) (discussing novelty).
32. The utility condition requires only that the invention work and that it serve
some minimal human need. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 31, at 1594 & n.33.
33. A claimed invention is obvious if the differences between it and the prior art
are such that the claimed invention would have been "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains." 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a patentee to describe the invention in terms
sufficient to enable others skilled in the relevant art to practice the invention; to disclose the inventor's "best mode," if any, of carrying out invention; and to conclude the
application by "distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention"); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997) (requiring an applicant to disclose
information known to the applicant to be material to patentability).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 283.
37. Id. § 284.
38. See 7 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 20.01, at 20-7 to -8; id. § 20.03,
at 20-77 (1998).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
40. Id. § 285.
41. See 7 Chisum, supra note 38, § 20.03[4], at 20-300.
42. The term "literary work" includes computer programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994) (defining "literary work"). Among the other works of authorship that are subject to copyright protection are dramatic, choreographic, and architectural works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; and sound recordings. See id. § 101 (defining
these terms); id. § 102 (listing works of authorship in which copyright may subsist).
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, id. §§ 901-14, provides a more limited form of protection for "mask works," as defined under § 901(a)(2), that are fixed
in semiconductor chips. See id. § 902. The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act renders the states amenable to suit in federal court for the infringement of mask works.
See id.§ 911(g)(1).
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"fixed" ' 4 4 in a "tangible medium of expression. '45 For works created
on or after January 1, 1978 (the date on which the current copyright
46
act took effect), copyright initially vests in the author of the work
4
7
and subsists from creation until seventy years after the author's
death.48 The copyright owner enjoys exclusive rights of reproduction,49 adaptation,5 0 distribution, 5 and public performance and display,5" subject to defenses such as fair use.5 3 In addition, under the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,14 the author of a "work of visual
art"-defined as the original, and certain limited edition copies, of
paintings, drawings, sculptures, and qualifying photographic
images5 5 -is accorded exclusive "moral rights '56 as well. Thus, under
43. The originality requirement means that the person claiming copyright protection engaged in some degree of independent creation and minimal creativity, either in
the expression of underlying facts or ideas, or in their selection, coordination, or arrangement. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51
(1991).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
45. Id. § 102 (a).
46. See id. § 201(a).
47. See id. § 302(a).
48. See An Act to Amend the Provisions of Title 17, United States Code, with
respect to the Duration of Copyright, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102(b), 112. Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending basic copyright term to life of author plus
seventy years).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
50. See id. § 106(2) (stating that the author has the exclusive right to prepare and
authorize preparation of derivative works based upon a copyrighted work). The act
defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
51. See id. § 106(3) (stating that the author has the exclusive right to distribute and
authorize distribution of copies or phonorecords of copyrighted work to the public).
But see id. § 109(a) (terminating the author's distribution right with respect to copies
or phonorecords that have been lawfully distributed).
52. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4)-(6) (West Supp. 1998); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "publicly"). The performance right applies to literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and
to digital sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4)-(6). The display right applies to
"literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work." Id. § 106(5); see also id.§ 109(c) (permitting the owner of a
lawfully made copy to display the copy publicly, "either directly or by the projection
of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is
located").
53. See id.§ 107 (providing limited defense for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, in light of various specified
factors); see also id.§§ 108-21 (setting forth additional limitations on exclusive
rights).
54. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-10, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work of visual art").
56. These rights are referred to as "moral rights," a translation of the French droit
moral, in recognition of the fact that French law was the first to acknowledge rights of

1999]

WHEN THE STATE STEALS IDEAS

1443

some circumstances, the author is entitled to claim authorship of the
work, 57 and to prevent the distortion, mutilation, or other modification or destruction of the work.58
Like patent claims, claims of copyright infringement are within the
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.5 9 A court
may enjoin the violation of any of the rights described above' and
may award the successful plaintiff her "actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer... that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages."'" In the alternative, the court may award "statutory damages... for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to
any one work... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000
as the court considers just" in lieu of actual damages and profits.62
These statutory damages may be increased to a sum of not more than
$100,000 in cases of willful infringement, or decreased to a sum of not
less than $200 in cases of innocent infringement.63 Finally, the court in
its discretion also may award the prevailing party costs and attorney
fees.64
3. Unfair Competition
A third source of intellectual property law is the law of unfair competition which embraces, among other things, the law of trademarks.'
Briefly stated, a trademark is any word or other symbol that identifies
this nature. See Thomas F.Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76
N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10-27 (1997) (discussing development of droit moral under French,
German, and American law).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (according the author the right to claim authorship
and to prevent the use of her name as the author of a work she did not create); see
also id § 106A(a)(2) (according the author the right to prevent use of her name as the
author of work that has been modified in a manner prejudicial to her honor or
reputation).
58. See id § 106A(a)(3)(A) (according the right to prevent intentional modification prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation); id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (according
the right to prevent the destruction of a "work of recognized stature"); id. § 113(d)
(modifying these rights with regard to works incorporated into buildings).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), (c) (1994).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (authorizing courts to enjoin violations of author's copyright and moral rights); see also id.§§ 106, 501(a) (defining the scope of copyright
protection); id. § 503 (authorizing courts to order destruction of infringing items).
61. Id § 504(a)-(b).
62. Id § 504(a), (c)(1). Subject to certain exceptions, however, the prevailing
plaintiff is not entitled to recover statutory damages or attorney's fees unless she registers her copyright either before it is infringed or within three months of its publication. See id § 412.
63. See id. § 504(c)(2).
64. See id § 505.
65. See generally Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 9-37 (1995) (detailing major topics of trademark law).
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a unique source of a product or service.6 6 At common law, the first

person to make a lawful, commercial use of a mark to identify her
product or service acquires the right to exclude others from using the
same or a confusingly similar mark for the same or a related product
or service; 67 this common-law right of exclusion, however, normally is
enforceable only within the markets in which the owner's products are
sold or otherwise known.68 The federal Lanham Act modifies these

common law rules in several important respects. 69 The act provides,
among other things, for the voluntary registration of marks used in
interstate commerce, 7° and it confers upon the owners of registered
marks the right to exclude others from the use of infringing marks
anywhere in the United States.71 In addition, section 43(a) of the Act
provides the owner of an unregistered, common-law mark with a federal cause of action against the use by another of a confusingly similar
mark in interstate commerce.72 The Act also provides a federal claim
for trademark "dilution," which is said to occur when another's use of
a similar mark threatens either to "blur" the mark's distinctive nature
or to "tarnish" it "through inherently negative or unsavory associations, or with goods or services that produce a negative response

66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9
(1995). Attributes such as product packaging and configuration (otherwise known as
"trade dress"), colors, sounds, and fragrances, can serve as trademarks under some
circumstances. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160-66
(1995) (discussing colors); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1
(1992) (discussing trade dress).
67. See generally 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, § 16:1, 4, at 5-6 (4th ed. 1997). In determining whether the defendant's
mark is likely to cause confusion with regard to source, sponsorship, or affiliation, a
court will consider factors such as the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the
goods on which they are used, the channels of trade in which they are sold or advertised, the sophistication of the class of prospective purchasers of the goods, the defendant's state of mind, and whether there is proof of any instances of actual
confusion. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 20-23 (1995).
68. See Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, Where It Doesn't Exist:
Rethinking Two Doctrinesfrom the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. I11.
L. Rev.
487, 491-92. Under certain circumstances, however, these common-law rights may be
enforceable beyond this limited geographic area. See id. at 492-94.
69. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997).
70. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-54.
71. See id. §§ 1072, 1115; see also id. § 1116 (providing for injunctive relief as a
remedy against infringement).
72. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) ("Any person who . . .uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... which ... is
likely to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action ...."); see also 4 McCar-

thy, supra note 67, §§ 27:14, 27:45, at 24-27, 72-73 (discussing federal question jurisdiction for infringement claims brought by owners of unregistered trademarks under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
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Only "famous" marks, however, qualify for antidilution pro-

tection under federal law.74
Unlike patent and copyright claims, a claim alleging violation of the
Lanham Act may be filed in either state or federal court.75 In a trademark infringement action the court may award injunctive relief76 and
either actual damages 7 (which may include lost profits, damages for
use in funding a corrective advertising campaign, or a reasonable royalty)78 or the defendant's profits attributable to the infringement.

9

The Act also authorizes the court to increase an award of actual damages up to three times"0 or-if the court finds "that the amount of
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive"-to
"enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. '8 1 As a matter of practice, however, courts generally award enhanced damages only in cases
involving willful infringement.82 Finally, as in patent law, the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees in "exceptional cases."' In actions involving trademark dilution, on the other hand, the act permits
injunctive relief but forbids the court from awarding damages, except
in cases of willful dilution. 84

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also creates a federal cause of
action for false advertising and product disparagement 5 False adver73. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. c (1995); see also Blair &
Cotter, supra note 31, at 1612 (suggesting, as an example, that blurring might result
from use of the TIFFANY mark for restaurant services, and tarnishment from its use
in connection with pornographic or illegal products).
74. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (setting forth factors to be considered in determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous to merit protection against dilution); see
also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. e (1995) ("As a general
matter, a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use if
the mark retains its source significance when encountered outside the context of the
goods or services with which the mark is used by the trademark owner.").
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)-(b) (1994). A claim alleging only a violation of state
trademark law must be filed in state court, however, unless it can be supported by
diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. See 5 McCarthy, supra note 67, § 32:1, at 32-9.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
77. See id. § 1117(a).
78. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 36 (1995); 5 McCarthy,
supra note 67, §§ 30:79-87, at 133-42.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (authorizing such recoveries "subject to the principles
of equity"). The Act recognizes certain exceptions to damages liability with regard to
defendants whose responsibility for an infringement is limited to the printing or advertising of an infringing mark. See id. § 1114(2).
80. See i. § 1117(a).
81. Id.
82. See 5 McCarthy, supra note 67, § 30:91, at 147-50.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
84. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2) (West 1998).
85. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1); see also 4 McCarthy, supra note 67, § 27:24, at 39
(noting elements of a prima facie case under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act); 1
Charles E. McKenney & George F. Long, III, Federal Unfair Competition: Lanham
Act § 43(a) §§ 2:02[4], 6:01 (1998) (same).
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tising consists of the making of a representation concerning one's own

goods or services that is likely both "to deceive or mislead prospective
purchasers" and to harm one's competitors,8 6 while product disparagement is the making of a materially false representation concerning
the competitor's goods or services.8 7 Under the Lanham Act, a person
who can demonstrate a likelihood of injury attributable to such a materially false statement has standing to assert a claim for either tort.8 8
The successful plaintiff is entitled to the same remedies that the act
provides for trademark infringement.8 9
B.

The Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment's restriction of Article III jurisdiction
poses a substantial obstacle to the enforcement of federal intellectual
property laws against the states. Article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to
... Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State
... and between a State... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 90
During ratification proceedings, proponents of the Constitution, led
by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, argued
that, despite the language of this provision, a sovereign state could not
be sued in federal court,9 1 because of pre-existing and implicit principles of sovereign immunity.'
Opponents of ratification responded
that the text of the provision clearly provides for federal jurisdiction
over cases against the states,93 and at least two states proposed
86. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 2 (1995).
87. See id. § 2 cmt. c.
88. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 67, § 27:24, 31-33, 39, 91, at 39, 49-54, 60-63, 13941; 1 McKenney & Long, supra note 85, § 6.04.
89. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1117, 1118 (1994).

90. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

91. Hamilton wrote, "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." The Federalist No. 81, at 450
(Alexander Hamilton) (The Colonial Press rev. ed., 1901). Madison stated:
[The federal jurisdiction in Article III] in controversies between a state and
citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It
is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.... It appears
to me that this [clause] can have no operation but this-to give a citizen a
right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be
a party, this court may take cognizance of it.
3 The Debates in The Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates]. Marshall
added, "It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged
before a court." Id. at 555.
92. For a discussion of the colonists' notions of sovereign immunity evolving from
British law, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425
(1987); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A

Reinterpretation,83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983).
93. See Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 2740 (1972). For instance, Patrick Henry observed, "If gentlemen pervert the most clear
expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of
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amendments to the Constitution to prohibit or limit suits against the
states.94

The Supreme Court vindicated the opponents of constitutional ratification in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia,95 interpreting Article
III to permit suits in federal court against a state by citizens of another
state. 96 The decision apparently sent a shock wave throughout the
Union.9 7 Congress responded by passing the Eleventh Amendment,

which provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-

cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."98 Since its ratification,
at least three major interpretations have evolved regarding the mean-

ing of the Eleventh Amendment, including the diversity theory, 99
all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies
between a state and citizens of another state, without discriminating between plaintiff
and defendant." Elliot's Debates, supra note 91, at 543.
94. See Clinton et al., Federal Courts Theory and Practice 1089-90 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
95. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
96. See id at 420-26.
97. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 372-74 (2d ed. 1994); 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United
States History 91-99 (rev. ed. 1935).
98. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
99. The diversity theory presents a narrow interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, positing that it only sets a limit on the federal judiciary's diversity jurisdiction.
See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment. A
Reply to Critics,56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261, 1297-99 (1989) (asserting that the Eleventh
Amendment bars only suits based on diversity jurisdiction and thus would not prohibit suits founded upon federal question jurisdiction); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constnction of an
Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,35
Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, supra note 92, at 1889. The theory does not establish a broad principle of sovereign immunity that would restrict federal jurisdiction
in its entirety. See Amar, supra note 92, at 1480 (arguing against "the Supreme
Court's vision of state sovereign immunity [because it] warps the very notion of government under law" and in favor of the diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale LJ. 1, 40 (1988) (contending that the Amendment affects only "party-based" jurisdiction, leaving "arising under" jurisdiction intact and
unrestricted). The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the diversity theory in Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), holding that, under existing law, the Eleventh Amendment granted a state immunity from suit brought in federal court by one of its own
citizens in a federal question case. See id. at 18. More recently, the Court explicitly
rejected the diversity theory in PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman,465
U.S. 89 (1984), ruling that the Amendment applies in cases founded upon federal
question jurisdiction as well as those founded upon diversity jurisdiction. See id. at
120. The Court elaborated that
the implicit view of [cases adopting the diversity theory] seems to have been
that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other
claims raised in the case. This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions.
Id. at 119.
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100. The congressional abrogation theory holds that while federal courts may not
exercise jurisdiction over defendant states by construing the Article III jurisdictional
grant in a broad fashion, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity and confer
this jurisdiction. See Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 694 (1976). Tribe explains:
[A]rticle III does not of its own force abrogate the defense of sovereign immunity .... Five years after Chisholm v. Georgia had erroneously construed
article III to the contrary, the Eleventh Amendment, in declaring that the
federal "judicial power.., shall not be [so] construed," restored the original
understanding.... On this view, it remains true after the Eleventh Amendment, just as it was true prior to Chisholm, that Congress, acting in accordance with its article I powers as augmented by the necessary and proper
clause, or acting pursuant to the enforcement clauses of various constitutional amendments, can effectuate the valid substantive purposes of federal
law by (1) compelling states to submit to adjudication in federal courts and/
or (2) compelling states to entertain designated federal claims in their own
courts.
Id.
This view is based on "the peculiar institutional competence of Congress in adjusting federal power relationships" resulting from the representation of states' interests
in Congress, id. at 696, in contrast with the absence of any real representation of state
interests in the federal judiciary. See id. at 695 & n.71. The Supreme Court has not
embraced the congressional abrogation theory; any doubts on that score were dispelled in Seminole Tribe, in which the Court held that Congress may not abrogate
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 71-72 (1996). The Seminole Tribe Court reasoned that the Eleventh
Amendment altered the original constitution, thereby limiting Congress's Article I
powers. See id.
101. The plain text theory of the Eleventh Amendment has garnered some scholarly support as well. This theory relies on a canon of construction instructing that
interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision should begin with the plain text,
and that the text should be rejected only if it is poorly drafted or the result is too
ridiculous to represent the intent of the drafters. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting
the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342, 1349 (1989) ("[Tlhe
exceptional clarity of the eleventh amendment significantly intensifies the burden of
showing that its framers and supporters meant something different from what they
said."). Advocates of this theory assert that the Amendment represents the result of
compromise in the political process rather than any single principle such as limitation
of diversity jurisdiction or congressional abrogation theory. See id. at 1353. Marshall
elaborates:
There is obvious tension between the immunity and accountability principles, but it is unnecessary and inappropriate to choose either of them as the
one value that the eleventh amendment implements. If the history of the
Constitution (not to mention modem legislation) tells us anything, it tells a
story of constant political compromise between dramatically opposed ideological, economic, and regional factions. To understand the "intent" or "purpose" behind any piece of legislation, . . . [ilt is ... important to consider
whether any one faction prevailed on the measure, or whether the provision
represents a rough compromise with which no one was entirely happy, but
which most everyone could accept. The fallacy of the current eleventh
amendment theories lies in their relentless demand for a single theoretical
principle that can coherently explain the amendment, and even better, also
explain how the amendment is consistent with the principles that gave rise to
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The Supreme Court, however, has not adopted any of the above
three theories. Indeed, the Court's aged and confused Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence makes it difficult to discern any unifying
principle. Commentators have suggested two theories regarding the
Supreme Court's current position: the forum-allocation theory and
the immunity-from-liability theory. The forum-allocation theory
holds that the Amendment does not preclude remedies for state viola-

tions of federal rights or foreclose the exercise of federal judicial
power to enforce such remedies, but merely defers the involvement of

the federal judiciary in enforcing federal liabilities of the states until
the state courts have had a chance to afford the required relief.' °

Professor Carlos Manuel V~zquez recently has argued that McKesson
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco supports this

view through its holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not defeat the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits brought
against the states.10 3 The immunity-from-liability theory, on the other
hand, would preclude even the Supreme Court's exercise of "appellate jurisdiction over suits arising in the state courts [except] 'where a
State has consented to suit,""' 1 4 thus "(effectively) immunizing the
states from monetary liability to private individuals."1 05
Because our toil here does not strive to mend all that is amiss in
Eleventh Amendment law, but only to see how that law, such as it is,
affects current intellectual property legislation, we do not attempt to
support either the forum-allocation or immunity-from-liability theory,

the Constitution. This may be a fascinating exercise, but it surely fails to
reflect the realities of the political process.
Id- at 1353 (footnotes omitted).
Plain text advocates also have argued that there are valid historical explanations for
the particular balance struck in the Amendment. For example, Marshall argues that
the Amendment's distinction between suits brought by in-state and out-of-state citizens can be explained because "the states were most concerned with suits filed by outof-state residents, and hence immunity was provided for that class of cases. On the
other hand, the competing principle of accountability argued strongly in favor of preserving federal jurisdiction wherever politically possible." Id. at 1362. The Supreme
Court discarded the plain text of the Amendment in Hans, reading -another state" to
include the same state, thereby rejecting this theory of the Amendment. See Hans,
134 U.S. at 20. In addition, "[iun one of its many departures from the text of the
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
constrain the jurisdiction of all federal courts: It does not limit the Supreme Court's
own appellate jurisdiction." Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity? 106 Yale LJ. 1683, 1701 (1997) (discussing McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 28-31
(1990)).
102. See Vdzquez, supra note 101, at 1688-89.
103. See id For defenses of the forum-allocation theory, see Jackson, supra note
99, at 6-7, and Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Erception", 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 102, 103 (1996).
104. Vlzquez, supra note 101, at 1702-03 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71
n.14).
105. Id at 1702.
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or to develop a third theory. 106 Rather, we will present the Court's
current view in only enough detail to facilitate our discussion.
The Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment, by the clear

terms of its text, forbids suits against a state in federal court brought
by citizens of another state or by foreign subjects. 1' 7 In addition, as
we noted above, Hans v. Louisiana extended the prohibition to suits
against a state by citizens of the same state, despite the absence of

textual support in the Amendment. 0 8 Significantly, the Amendment
applies in federal question as well as diversity cases, 109 although it
does not defeat the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. For exam-

ple, in McKesson, 110 the Court held that when the Due Process Clause

requires a state to provide a monetary remedy in state court for its
violation of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

Supreme Court review of a state court's refusal to provide the
remedy."'

There are some exceptions to state immunity from the reach of original federal jurisdiction. First, municipalities and state political subdivisions are not immune from suit. 112 Second, in Ex parte Young,1 3 the
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
for injunctive relief against state officers." 4 The Ex parte Young doc-

trine is alive and well today" 5 despite its fictional foundation that an

106. We should note, however, the potential impact of these theories. If the forumallocation theory is correct, it seems that Congress could give the state courts jurisdiction to hear federal infringement claims against the states and thereby subject the
states to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, without offending the Eleventh
Amendment and regardless of any power to abrogate immunity. This would not be
possible under the immunity-from-liability theory. If Congress still may abrogate sovereign immunity by virtue of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), however, neither of these theories would
preclude the enforcement of federal laws against the states in federal courts where the
federal laws are appropriate exercises of congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
107. See Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 383 (citing In re New York, 256 U.S. 490
(1921): Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); and Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516
(1899)).
108. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890).
109. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984)
(stating that the "Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing
even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts").
110. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
111. See id. at 27-31.
112. See Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 386 (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529
(1890)). But see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 123-24 (holding that a county was immune
from suit where the state funded and participated in the operation of a county
program).
113. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
114. See id. at 159-60.
115. In the two recent cases of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) and
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), the Court reaffirmed the continued
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officer who proceeds in "conflict with the superior authority of [the
federal] Constitution... is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct." 116 Third, suits against state officers for prospective, as opposed to retrospective,
monetary relief are permissible
17
under Edelman v. Jordan.

States also may waive their immunity from suit."' Explicit waiver
requires a state to make a clear statement of its willingness to be sued
in federal court specifically."19 The contours (as well as the continued
validity) of the doctrine of constructive waiver are somewhat more
difficult to assess. The doctrine has its genesis in the Supreme Court's
1964 decision of Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks

Department," where the Court held that the State of Alabama had
implicitly consented to suit in federal court in an action arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") by virtue of its ownership and operation of a railroad.12 In a series of subsequent decisions, however, the Court has retreated from this broad conception of
constructive consent. First, in Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare," 2 the
Court limited the Parden doctrine to cases in which the state has engaged in nontraditional government functions, such as the operation
of the for-profit railroad at issue in Parden."3 States therefore may
retain their immunity when engaging in traditional governmental business, such as the operation of nonprofit public hospitals 24 and the
provision of public education."as Second, in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation,26 the Court partially
viability of the Ex parte Young doctrine but pared its scope. For a more detailed
discussion of the impact of these two cases on the Er parte Young doctrine, see infra
note 455.
116. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
117. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
118. See Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 406.
119. See id.
120. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987).
121. See id at 194-98. The Court concluded first that, because FELA did not expressly exempt states from the scope of its regulation, the State of Alabama became
subject to the statute when it functioned in the capacity of a "common carrier." See id.
at 187-90. Second, the Court reasoned that "the States surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce" under Article I, idat 191, and that as a result a state constructively waives its immunity when it
engages in an activity the right to which Congress has made conditional upon amenability to suit in federal court. See id at 190-98.
122. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
123. See id at 284.
124. See id at 284-85.
125. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex'pense Bd.,
131 F.3d 353, 363-65 (3d Cir. 1997), cert granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999)
(No. 98-149).
126. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
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overruled Parden,holding that a state does not constructively consent

unless Congress "express[es] in unmistakable statutory language its
intention to allow States to be sued in federal court .... 7 Finally, a

few courts have read Seminole Tribe as standing for the proposition
that Congress has no authority whatsoever to abrogate, or require a
waiver of, state sovereign immunity when legislating
pursuant to Arti8
cle I, thus overruling Parden'scentral holding.'1

Finally, Congress may abrogate state immunity in some circumstances. In Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,2 9 the Court ruled that Congress may
abrogate state immunity pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment
altered the federal-state balance of power envisioned in the passage of

the Eleventh Amendment. 3 ° Following Fitzpatrick, the Court hinted
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 3 ' that Congress also may be

able to abolish state immunity under its other constitutional powers,
127. Id. at 475.
128. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 285-87, (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that Seminole Tribe overrules Parden);College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 418-20 (D.N.J. 1996) (same), aff'd on
other grounds, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan.
8, 1999) (No. 98-149), and affd on other grounds, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531); Kish v. Verniero (In re
Kish), 212 B.R. 808, 815 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (same); John T. Cross, Intellectual
Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole Tribe, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 519,
537-38 (1998) (same); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 43-44
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Supreme
Court should expressly declare that Congress may not use its Article I power to
abridge state sovereign immunity), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the viability of
the Parden doctrine is "precarious" in light of Seminole Tribe); Jacqueline D. Ewenstein, Seminole Tribe: Are States Free to Pirate Copyrights with Impunity?, 22 Colum.VLA J.L. & Arts 91, 105-07, 109 (1997) (describing the implied consent as resting "on
shaky constitutional grounds"). One commentator, however, has argued recently that
Seminole Tribe leaves open the possibility that Congress may continue to condition
state activities upon the state's consent to suit in federal court, as long as those activities are truly voluntary ones. See Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe,
82 Minn. L. Rev. 793, 795 (1998). Kinports argues, among other things, that a state's
decision to use copyrighted material in connection with voluntary, non-core state
functions could be deemed to constitute a constructive waiver. See id. at 817-18. Even
if this theory is correct, however, state uses of intellectual property in connection with
traditional government functions such as public works and education would continue
to fall outside the scope of the waiver. As we demonstrate herein, many state uses of
intellectual property are likely to arise in precisely such settings. Cf. Chavez, 157 F.3d
at 291-95 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (concluding that Parden remains viable after Seminole Tribe, but only under very limited circumstances; and that the waiver theory does
not provide adequate justification for the Copyright and Trademark Remedy Clarification Acts).
129. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
130. See id. at 456; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996)
(stating that Fitzpatrick was based upon the rationale that the Fourteenth Amendment "operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power
achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment").
131. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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but that to do so Congress must state specifically and unequivocally in
the statute's text its intent to confer federal jurisdiction over the
states. 32 A few years later, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,33 a

fragmented Court determined that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),
which was passed pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power,
contained the explicit statement of intent to abrogate required by
Atascadero and held that "Congress has the authority to render [the
states] so liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."'"
In 1996, the Supreme Court overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe.
The plaintiff, Seminole Tribe of Florida, had filed suit against the State
of Florida to compel certain negotiations between the state and the
tribe pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a federal statute
Congress had enacted under its Article I power to regulate commerce
with Indian Tribes.'
In a five to four decision, the Court held that
Congress may not abolish Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to its Article I powers, thus leaving the Fourteenth Amendment as
Congress's only avenue for subjecting nonconsenting states to suit in
federal court for retrospective monetary relief for violations of federal
law. 136 Both the majority and the dissent recognized that the decision's implications extended far beyond the constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that
denying Congress the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under
Article I threatened portions of several other federal statutes, including the copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws, that purport to
render the states amenable to suit in federal court.137 In response,
however, the majority suggested that "several avenues remain open
for ensuring state compliance with federal law," such as "obtain[ing]
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in3 order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law."'1
Seminole Tribe therefore radically altered the landscape of Eleventh
Amendment law, rendering the contours of waiver and abrogation
doctrine unclear and leaving courts and commentators to contemplate
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 246.
491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
1& at 23.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47-48.
See id at 65-66.
See id at 77 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 72 n.16; see also id. at 70-71 nn.13-14 (noting that a state may consent to

suit, that the federal government may bring suit in federal court against a state, and
that the Supreme Court may "review a question of federal law arising from a state
court decision where a State has consented to suit"). The Court nevertheless held

that injunctive relief was not available on the peculiar facts of Seminole Tribe itself.
See iL at 74-76. We discuss this issue in greater detail infra at note 454 and accompanying text.
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the number of federal statutory casualties left in its wake.' 3 9 This Ar-

ticle focuses on the fate of one set of federal laws, the Remedy Clarification Acts.
C.

The Remedy Clarification Acts

Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Atascadero that Congress
must express its intent, if any, to abrogate sovereign immunity "in unmistakable language in the statute itself,"140 courts in the late 1980s

began to conclude that states were immune from infringement suits in
federal court because none of the relevant
legislation contained the
14
requisite statement of intent to abrogate. '
In response, Congress in 1990 enacted the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act' 4 2 "to clarify that States... are subject to suit in Federal
court by any person for infringement of copyright ....

,,14

This act

amended § 501 of the Copyright Act so as to include an express state139. See, e.g., Mueller v. Idaho (In re Mueller), 211 B.R. 737, 740-41 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1997) (invalidating Congress's attempt to abrogate state immunity from suits in
bankruptcy); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400, 423-27 (D.N.J. 1996) (upholding Congress's abrogation of sovereign
immunity under the Patent Remedy Clarification Act for patent infringement suits
but striking down Congress's attempt to do the same under the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act with respect to state immunity for certain violations of unfair competition provisions of Lanham Act), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,67
U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149), and affid, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531); see also infra
note 153 (discussing other cases).
140. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
141. See S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 5-6 (1992) (discussing patent and trademark cases),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3091-92; H.R. Rep. No. 101-282(I), at 2 & n.6
(1990) (collecting copyright cases), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3950 & n.6;
U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Liability of States and The Eleventh Amendment:
A Report of the Register of Copyrights 93-97 (1988) [hereinafter Copyright Liability
Report] (discussing cases).
142. Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a),
511, 910(a), 911(g) (1994)).
143. H.R. Rep. No. 101-282(I), at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3949.
The term "Remedy Clarification Act" reflects the belief, expressed in the House Report accompanying the act, that "the intent of Congress when it passed the 1976
Copyright Act was that all defendants in copyright infringement suits, including States
as well as private defendants, be liable for money damages." Id. at 2, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3950. The Report points out that the 1976 Act authorizes suit and
imposes remedies against "anyone" and "any person," with no express exclusion of
states. See id. at 5, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3953. It also notes that a few
provisions of the Copyright Act explicitly exempt governmental bodies from liability,
suggesting that Congress did not intend for the states to be immune in other respects.
See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(2),(6) (1976) (exempting governmental bodies from
liability for certain performances of nondramatic literary and musical works)), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3953; see also 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(3) (1994) (exempting from scope of so-called manufacturing clause works imported into United
States for use by federal or state governments). The Report also argues that injunctive relief alone would be inadequate to protect copyright owners, see H.R. Rep. No.
101-282(I), at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3956, and rejects the argument
that state courts should be granted concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over copy-
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ment that states shall be subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act
"in the same manner and to the same extent" as are nongovernmental
actors. 1" It also added a new provision, § 511, which provides (1) that
"[a]ny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her
official capacity, shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment... or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit
in Federal court by any person... for a violation of" the Copyright
Act;145 and (2) that all of the remedies available against nongovernmental entities, including actual and statutory damages, profits, and
attorney's fees and costs, are available in a suit against a state or state
entity. 14 Two years later Congress enacted similar amendments to
the Patent' 47 and Lanham Acts."4
Two aspects of the Remedy Clarification Acts are of particular interest for present purposes. First, the legislative history of the Patent
and Trademark Remedy Clarification Acts states explicitly that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity from patent and trademark claims pursuant to both its Article I and Fourteenth
Amendment powers. 14 9 During consideration of the earlier-enacted

Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, however, Congress considered
only whether it possessed the power to abrogate under Article I.15°
right claims against the states. See id. at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3949,
3957.
144. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, § 2(a), 104 Stat.

2749, 2749-50 (1990) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)). Section 2(b) of this Act enacts
provisions that are materially identical to this and the following two provisions noted
in the text above. See id. § 2(b), 104 Stat. at 2750 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 910(a) and

enacting 17 U.S.C. § 911(g)).
145. Id. § 2(b), 104 Stat. at 2749 (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 511(a)).

146. See id (enacting 17 U.S.C. § 511(b)).
147. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L No.

102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(a)-(b), 2570 (1994); 35
U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994)). Using language similar to that found in the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act, this Act purports to abrogate the immunity of states and
state instrumentalities (as well as officers and employees of states and state instrumentalities) from patent infringement actions in federal court, see 7 U.S.C. § 2570(a);
35 U.S.C. § 296(a), and provides that the same remedies are available against these
state defendants as are available against nongovernmental entities. See 7 U.S.C.

§ 2570(b); 35 U.S.C. § 296(b).
148. See Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567
(1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (1994)). Using language
similar to that found in the other two Remedy Clarification Acts, the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act removes state defendants' immunity from Lanham Act
suits in federal court, see 15 U.S.C. § 1122(a), and renders them amenable to the same

remedies that are available against nongovernmental defendants, see id. § 1122(b).
149. See S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
3093-94. The report, however, does not spell out how the Fourteenth Amendment
abrogation theory works; hence this article.
150. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-282(1), at 6-7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3949,3954-55. Although this report notes that the abrogation "power under the Fourteenth Amendment has been repeatedly upheld," id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3949, 3954-55, the statement is made in the context of a detailed discussion of Con-
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Whether this failure to expressly invoke the Fourteenth Amendment
affects the constitutionality of the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act is unclear. On the one hand, as the court in College Savings Bank

v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board'51 re-

cently noted in dictum, the Supreme Court has stated (albeit in a different context) that it "never require[s] a legislature to articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute.' 15 Several other recent cases addressing Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from other
types of federal claims are in accord. 53 On the other hand, given the
gress's power to abrogate under Article I. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3949, 3954-55 ("The Committee believes that the Union Gas reasoning applies equally
to the Copyright Clause of Article I."); see also Copyright Liability Report, supra
note 141, at 104 (recommending clarification of intent to abrogate sovereign immunity from copyright claims "[i]f Union Gas permits Article I abrogation" without discussion of abrogation under Fourteenth Amendment theory). But see Copyright
Remedy ClarificationAct and Copyright Office Report on Copyright Liability of States:
Hearings on H.R. 1131 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Admin. of Justice, 101st Cong. 194, 196 (1989) (report adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, Feb. 1988) (stating that "patents, trademarks,
and copyrights are property and uncompensated state infringement can be considered
to be a taking in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
151. 948 F. Supp. 400 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for
cert. filed 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1998) (No. 98-149), and aff'd, 148 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 1998), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1998) (No. 98531).
152. Id. at 422-23 n.23 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
315 (1993)). In Beach Communications,508 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted), the Court
observed that, on rational-basis review, "those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it,"' and that "because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons
for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature."
153. Perhaps the leading case is Timmer v. Michigan Department of Commerce, 104
F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997). In Timmer, the plaintiffs filed suit against a state agency for
violation of a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") known as the Equal
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). See Timmer, 104 F.3d at 835. While noting that
"Congress did not expressly state the constitutional basis of its extension of the FLSA
to the States in 1974," id. at 838, the court cited Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138, 144 (1948), and dicta in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983),
for the proposition that "[tihe ...constitutionality of action taken by Congress does
not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise." Timmer, 104
F.3d at 840 (quoting Woods, 333 U.S. at 149). The court also noted that, in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court had
cautioned against "quickly attribut[ing] to Congress an unstated intent to act under its
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment" when "legislation imposes congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and ...intrudes on traditional state authority."
Timmer, 104 F.3d at 840 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 16). Pennhurst, however,
also
distinguish[ed] between two kinds of cases: those where "statutes... simply
prohibited certain kinds of state conduct" and those like the one before the
Court in Pennhurst, where the "case for inferring intent is at its weakest
where.., the rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to
fund certain services, since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly
attempt to impose massive financial obligations on the States." In other
words, the Court did not suggest that a court should never infer a congres-
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Court's obsession with the need for a clear statement of abrogation
within the statutory text," it requires little imagination to envision
the Court's going one step further and invalidating an abrogation statute if Congress fails to identify the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the abrogation. 55 Because our principal focus is upon whether
a Fourteenth Amendment theory can support legislation like the
Remedy Clarification Acts, we will not attempt to resolve this issueother than to note that, even if the latter reading of the case law is
correct, Congress can explicitly abrogate immunity pursuant to its section 5 powers, if the Fourteenth Amendment theory works. As we
shall demonstrate in the remaining portions of this Article, however,
the assumption that this theory works is tenuous.
A second important feature is Congress's intent, clearly evidenced
in all three acts, to render the states liable for infringement "in the
same manner and to the same extent" as private actors. 15 6 The princisional intent to legislate pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather that it should first consider a number of factors before making such an
inference.
Id at 840-41 (quoting Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 16-17). The court concluded that, because the Equal Pay Act "simply prohibit[s] certain kinds of state conduct," and because "Congress clearly intended to impose congressional policy on the States," it was
appropriate to infer "a congressional intent to act pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 841 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 16). Several courts have
agreed with 7unmer in addressing the constitutionality of other abrogation legislation.
See, e.g., Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,42-44 (1st Cir. 1997) (involving the FLSA); Hurd
v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1545 (10th Cir. 1997) (involving the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F.
Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (involving the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act).
154. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
155. Cf Schlossberg v. Comptroller (In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc.), 119 F.3d
1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997) (asserting in a case involving alleged abrogation of immunity from a claim filed by a trustee in bankruptcy, that the court "will not presume
that Congress intended to enact a law under a general Fourteenth Amendment power
to remedy an unspecified violation of rights when a specific, substantive Article I
power clearly enabled the law"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998); MacPherson v.
University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 789 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that "[i]f
Congress intended to amend the ADEA based upon § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment it could have done so, as it did with respect to the 1972 amendments to Iitle
VII"), aff'd sub norn. Kimel v. State Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998);
see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential
Eviscerationof Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495, 508 n.53 (1997) (suggesting
that one question raised by Seminole Tribe is whether Congress, in enacting laws that
purport to abrogate state sovereign immunity, must "indicate an intent to have relied"
on some particular theory, or whether courts "should ...

look to any power that

might reasonably be relied on to sustain the law").
156. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994) (stating that states "shall be subject to the provisions
of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity"); see 7 U.S.C. § 2541(f) (1994) (similar); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1127 (1994) (similar); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 910(a) (1994) (similar); cf 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (exempting
governmental entities from liability for performance of nondramatic musical works in
course of agricultural or horticultural fairs or exhibitions, and providing that exemption "shall extend to any liability for copyright infringement that would otherwise be
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pie of treating states in the same manner as private actors would appear to require that states are liable under the doctrine of vicarious
liability for infringing acts committed by state employees or contractors, under circumstances that would render a private actor liable
under that doctrine.157 As we shall see, however, if this interpretation
is correct, the acts appear to impose liability under some circumstances that would
not give rise to a takings claim under the Fifth
158

Amendment.

II.

THE TAKINGS THEORY

In this part, we discuss whether Congress's power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Takings Clause (as incorporated into section 1 of that amendment) 59 provides an adequate
basis for the Remedy Clarification Acts. At first glance, the Takings
Clause, which provides that private property may not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation,"' 60 seems like a reasonable
candidate for upholding the validity of the acts. Patents, copyrights,
and trademarks certainly can be viewed as a type of property (people
refer to them as "intellectual property," after all), and there is a surface plausibility to the argument that, when a state actor acting within
the scope of his employment uses intellectual property without the
consent of the owner he in effect "takes" an intellectual property license. For these reasons, a number of courts and commentators have
imposed on such body or organization, under doctrines of vicarious liability or related
infringement").
157. In patent law, vicarious liability is determined by the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior. See 5 Chisum, supra note 38, § 16.06[1], at 249. Under the traditional formulation of the doctrine, an employer is liable for torts committed by an
employee within the scope of her employment; and an act may be deemed within the
scope of employment if "the purpose of serving the master's business actuates the
servant to any appreciable extent." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 236 cmt. b
(1958). Trademark law may follow the same rule, but there are very few cases on
point. See AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1433-34 & n.15 (3d
Cir. 1994) (applying traditional agency principles, but noting only one other decision
on point). In copyright law, by contrast, an actor may be liable not only for infringing
acts committed by an employee within the scope of her employment, but even for the
acts of independent contractors, if the actor (1) possesses the right and ability to supervise the infringer's conduct, and (2) has an obvious and direct financial interest in
the exploitation of the work. See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 12.04[A][1], at 12-68, -70 (1998). In addition, in all three bodies of law,
an actor can be liable for contributory infringement or for inducing another to infringe, under some circumstances. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (setting forth elements
of active infringement and contributory inducement of infringement under federal
patent law); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (setting
forth elements under federal trademark law); 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra,
§ 12.04[A][2], at 12-72 (discussing contributory infringement under copyright law).
158. See infra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
159. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment) (citing
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)).
160. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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suggested that at least some state uses of intellectual property consti161
tute takings of private property for which just compensation is due.
We nevertheless conclude that attempts to ground the Remedy

Clarification Acts in the Takings Clause must fail, for several reasons.
First, as we demonstrate in the following section, even if all of the
standard conditions that normally implicate the Takings Clause are
present, 162 it appears that Congress intended for the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts to preempt the states' ability to exercise their
eminent domain power over federal intellectual property rights, rather
than to provide a means for compelling the payment of just compensation subsequent to the exercise of that power. As a consequence,

when a state uses a patent, copyright, or trademark without the
owner's consent, it commits a wrongful act. 163 Put another way, the
takings theory assumes that the state has not only the power but also
the right to effect takings, as long as it pays compensation. 164 As we
shall demonstrate, however, the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts
proceed on precisely the opposite assumption: namely, that the states
161. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of a patent infringement claim against a state entity, but stating that the plaintiff could assert a takings claim against the defendant in
state court); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400, 426 (D.N.J. 1996) (suggesting that the state entity's use of the patent
effected a taking without just compensation), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149), and aff'd, 148 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531);
Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 710-13 (N.D. I1. 1974) (same); Jacobs
Wind Elec. Co. v. Department of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1335-37 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a state court has jurisdiction to decide whether a defendant effected a taking
of a patent); Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514, 515-16 (Ohio C1. App. 1992)
(concluding that a plaintiff who alleged that the state used his patented invention
without permission had a cause of action under the eminent domain theory, but that
the appropriate forum was a state court of claims rather than a state court of general
jurisdiction); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property.
The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 685, 692-726 (1989) (arguing, among
other things, that state uses of copyrights may implicate the Fifth Amendment); cf.
Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of a
patent infringement claim against the State of California on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, and suggesting that the plaintiff's claim, like claims against United States
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, "is based on principles related to the taking of property," but
declining to speculate as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to remedy under state
law); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming judgment for the state, in a case involving the alleged taking of a patented
process, in light of a lack of evidence that the state actually participated in unlawful
use, and distinguishing Jacobs Wind and Wilcox on the ground that in both cases there
was clearly a taking).
162. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 174-213 and accompanying text.
164. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304,314 (1987) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit the taking
of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power").
The Fifth Amendment "is designed not to limit the governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking." Id. at 315.
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have no right to infringe rights protected under the federal intellectual
property laws.

Furthermore, as we demonstrate in sections B and C, there are at
least two additional reasons why the takings theory cannot sustain
most applications of the Remedy Clarification Acts. First, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank,16 5 a state that takes private property

does not violate the Takings Clause until it refuses to pay the owner
just compensation; as a result, the assertion of a takings claim against
a state in federal court is not ripe until the state has first denied compensation in a state inverse-condemnation suit, a condition that is noticeably lacking from the Remedy Clarification Acts. 166 Second, at
least some uses of intellectual property by state actors for which the
states themselves would be vicariously liable under the Remedy Clarification Acts are likely to rest upon insufficient legislative authorization to implicate the Fifth Amendment. 167 This latter argument
suggests that, even if our other arguments were incorrect, at best the

takings theory would support only some applications of the Remedy
Clarification Acts.

A.

Preemption

As a general rule, the Takings Clause is implicated when, among
other things, (1) the state has deprived the claimant of a property interest; 168 (2) the deprivation is for a "public purpose;

' 169

and (3) the

deprivation is authorized, "expressly or by necessary implication," by
the appropriate legislative body. 170 For present purposes, we shall assume that most (though probably not all) state uses of intellectual
property without the owner's consent deprive the owner of a property

interest.171 We also shall assume that most such deprivations that are

165. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
166. See infra notes 214-44 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
168. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984).
169. Id. at 1000-01, 1014-16.
170. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335 (1910).
171. Some support for this proposition can be found in Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 100104, in which the Supreme Court held that trade secrets (defined infra at note 178) are
a form of property subject to the Takings Clause and in several older cases in which
the Court strongly suggested that patents are property as well. See, e.g., James v.
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (stating that the patentee has an exclusive
property interest "which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation"). Moreover, the factors the Court cited in Monsanto as
reasons for concluding that trade secrets are property, such as the fact that they are
assignable and may form the corpus of a trust, see 467 U.S. at 1002, apply as well to
copyrights and trademarks. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual
Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 566 (1998). A few
intellectual property rights are difficult to classify as property under these criteria,
however. These include moral rights, which are not assignable, see id. at 567, as well
as the unfair competition rights to be free from false advertising and product dispar-
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remediable under the Remedy Clarification Acts, assuming that the
latter are constitutional, also satisfy the public use requirement."7
The authorization element presents
greater difficulties, which we dis173
cuss in a subsequent section.

Even when these requirements are satisfied, however, the state's
use of or interference with private property does not necessarily con-

stitute a taking. In the real property context, for example, a physical
occupation of property (or a regulation authorizing a physical occupa-

tion) is almost always viewed as effecting a taking,1 74 even when it
amounts only to the imposition of an easement or servitude.1 7 - At the

same time, a regulation that interferes with use or enjoyment but that
does not cause a physical invasion may escape classification as a taking, unless it destroys all or most of the value of the subject property. 7 6 With regard to intellectual property, however, the law is
agement. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,

131 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that, "just because the state's actions
impact on a private business does not mean that" the right to be free from false advertising is a property interest), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No.
98-149); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948
F. Supp. 400, 426-28 (D.N.J. 1996) affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67
U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8,1999) (No. 98-149), and aff'd, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531); Cotter, supra,
at 568; see also infra notes 274-94 and accompanying text (discussing whether intellectual property is "property" for purposes of procedural due process).
172. The public use element is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers" and is satisfied as long as the taking has some "conceivable public character."
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014 (citation omitted). In light of this standard, most uses of
intellectual property by state actors for which the state is vicariously liable if the Remedy Clarification Acts are constitutional probably satisfy the public use element. As
noted above, the doctrine of vicarious liability renders an employer liable for torts
committed by an employee within the scope of her employment, and an employee's
conduct is normally deemed to be within the scope of her employment if the purpose
of serving the employer's business actuates the employee's conduct to any appreciable
extent. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 237 cmt. a (1958). If a state can be
vicariously liable only when a state actor's use of intellectual property is intended to
some appreciable extent to serve the state's "business," it seems likely that the use
will be cloaked with some "conceivable public character." Cf infra note 432 and accompanying text (discussing whether state uses of intellectual property are likely to
be arbitrary and capricious). But see supra note 157 (noting that the scope of vicarious
liability in copyright is more expansive than under traditional tort doctrine).
173. See infra notes 245-62 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
("In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation.").
175. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
176. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (holding that state effects taking when "regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land"); see also id. at 1027
("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with."); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
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somewhat less clear. On the one hand, in a series of federal cases
dating from 1881 to the present day, courts have sometimes referred
to the use by the federal government of patented inventions as takings
of private property for public use. 177 On the other hand, in the most

recent Supreme Court decision dealing with an alleged taking of intellectual property (specifically, trade secrets), 78 the Court considered
the character of the governmental action, its impact, and its effect
upon expectations to find that a federal statute operated to effect a
taking with respect to some, but not all, trade secret information submitted to the federal government over a period of time. 179 This osten-

sible disparity in approaches has led to widely varying conclusions as
to whether most, some, or very few federal uses of intellectual prop80

erty qualify as takings.1

Law § 9-3, at 593 n.3 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the Court has sustained
"[u]ncompensated losses in excess of 75% of a property's value caused by
regulation").
177. See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (stating that a patent
"confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which
cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation"); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a
taking of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of
its power of eminent domain .... ), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 520 U.S.
1183 (1997); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) ("When
the government has infringed, it is deemed to have 'taken' the patent license under an
eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required by the
fifth amendment."). But see De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 386-89
(1993) (concluding that statements like the preceding ones are dicta, and that in reality federal uses of patented inventions do not implicate the Fifth Amendment).
178. Under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, which has been adopted in a majority of
states, a trade secret is:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that... derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and . . . is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). The Remedy
Clarification Acts do not purport to render the states amenable to suit in federal court
for the misappropriation of trade secrets.
179. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-16 (1984). The plaintiff,
a pesticide manufacturer, claimed that certain provisions of a federal statute, requiring it to submit to the Environmental Protection Agency information relating to its
products, effected a taking for public use. See id. at 998-99. The Court agreed that the
government's use or disclosure, in accordance with statutory criteria, of data submitted between 1972 and 1978 could effect a taking for public use, but that no such use or
disclosure had yet been proven. See id. at 1010-20. Use of information submitted
before and after these dates, however, would not effect a taking, because under the
criteria in place at those times the manufacturer had no reasonable expectation that
the information it submitted to the government would remain confidential. See id. at
1006-10; see also Cotter, supra note 171, at 550-55 (discussing Monsanto).
180. Compare Kwall, supra note 161 (arguing that many governmental uses of intellectual property effect takings), with Vdzquez, supra note 101, at 1745 n.281 (argu-
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In a companion article, one of us attempts to reconcile the preceding authorities and to determine under what circumstances the use of
intellectual property by the federal government constitutes a taking
for public use.'' Without attempting to exhaustively address this issue here, we shall assume that many-perhaps most-federal uses of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks are more like the imposition of
easements upon land than they are like the regulation of use or enjoyment, and that as a consequence these uses may constitute takings,
even if they deprive the owner of only a small portion of the value of
her property.'82 As we shall demonstrate, however, even if this conclusion is correct, it does not follow that the Remedy Clarification
Acts should be read as enforcing the Takings Clause against the states,
for to assume that they do means that states may condemn federal
rights-a rather odd conclusion, in light of the language of the acts
themselves. 3
ing that only those uses that "virtually destroy" the property's value qualify as takings
(quoting Tribe, supra note 176, § 9-3, at 593)).
181. See Cotter, supra note 171, at 558-65.
182. See id. (largely adopting this view).
183. Of course, the preemption argument that follows in the text above would fail if
the Tenth Amendment-which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people"-prevented Congress from preempting a state's
eminent domain power over federal intellectual property rights. Any argument that
the Tenth Amendment compels this result is tenuous, however, in light of Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the
Court held that any limit imposed by the Tenth Amendment upon Congress's power
to regulate the states when enacting legislation within the scope of its power to regulate interstate commerce is judicially unenforceable. See id. at 555-57. As Vdzquez
notes, the Court "backtracked somewhat," supra note 101, at 1704, by holding, in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992), that Congress may not single out
the states by imposing upon them duties that are not applicable to nonstate actors. See
also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (reaffirming New York).
Nevertheless, Congress generally appears to retain the power to regulate the states in
the same manner as it may regulate private parties. See Vdzquez, supra note 101, at
1704.
In her 1989 article on the intersection of takings and copyright law, supra note 161,
Professor Kwall argues that, even after Garcia,the Tenth Amendment precludes Congress from preempting states' eminent domain powers pursuant to § 201(e) of the
Copyright Act. Section 201(e) states that:
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily
by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise
rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under [the Bankruptcy Code].
17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1994). As Kwall demonstrates, Congress added this provision to
the 1976 Copyright Act in order to preclude the Soviet Union from inhibiting the
distribution in the United States of works of dissident Soviet authors by claiming ownership of their works, which only recently had become eligible for copyright protection in the United States following the U.S.S.R.'s accession to the Universal
Copyright Convention. See Kwall, supra note 161, at 695-96. Kwall notes, however,
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We begin with the familiar preemption analysis as described by the
Supreme Court most recently in cases such as Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,184 FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick,18 5 and Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr.'8 6 Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, all laws of
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. .any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
that a literal reading of § 201(e) might forbid the states as well as the federal government of the United States from effecting takings of copyrights. See id. at 696-97.
While conceding that, in Garcia,the Supreme Court "abdicated the responsibility...
of reviewing federal regulations promulgated under the commerce clause to ensure
their compliance with the principles of federalism," id. at 708, Kwall argues that
§ 201(e), if read as a prohibition on the exercise of the states' eminent domain powers, nevertheless might be invalid under the Tenth Amendment because: (1) Garcia
expressly addresses Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, and
not other provisions of the Constitution such as the Patent and Copyright Clause, see
id. at 708-09; (2) Garcia alludes to the continued existence of some limits imposed by
the Tenth Amendment upon Congress's power to regulate the states pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, and the elimination of a state's power to effect takings of copyrights "arguably is so 'destructive of state sovereignty' that it necessitates judicial intervention, even under the rationale of Garcia," id. at 710 (quoting Garcia,469 U.S. at
554); (3) even under a deferential standard of review, which would uphold an act that
promotes a legitimate end "as long as the means adopted 'are plainly adapted' to the
end, 'are not prohibited,' and are 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,'" id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)), the
justifications for § 201(e) are "questionable," given the lack of evidence that copyright is an effective tool of censorship, id.; and (4) § 201(e) does not evince a sufficiently clear statement of Congress's intent to eliminate a sovereign state function, see
id. at 710-11.
We nevertheless conclude that the Tenth Amendment provides few obstacles to the
abrogation of state taking powers with regard to federal intellectual property rights.
For one thing, any relevant distinction between Congress's power to impose obligations upon the states when acting pursuant to its commerce power and when acting
pursuant to other powers under Article I seems dubious in light of Seminole Tribe. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (apparently holding that Congress
may not abrogate sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to Commerce Clause, or
any other Article I power). Moreover, whatever the state of the law may have appeared to be when Kwall wrote her article in 1989, as Vizquez notes "Garcia has
come to be understood as holding that the Tenth Amendment does not place limits on
Congress's power to regulate the states," except perhaps when "extraordinary defects
in the national political process" are present. Vizquez, supra note 101, at 1704 n.97
(quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988)). Precluding the states
from condemning federal intellectual property rights-which, as Kwall herself concedes, is something the states themselves have rarely, if ever, expressly claimed the
power to do in the first place, see Kwall, supra note 161, at 694, 705-06 n.102-hardly
seems so extraordinarily destructive of state sovereignty as to require intervention
under current law. Finally, even if § 201(e) lacks sufficient justification for the elimination of eminent domain powers, the later-enacted Remedy Clarification Acts seem
to have been adopted specifically for the legitimate end of preventing the states from
enjoying an advantage over private parties with respect to the use of intellectual creations, see supra notes 8, 140-48 and accompanying text, and therefore almost certainly would pass muster under a deferential standard of review.
184. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
185. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
186. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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'
notwithstanding."187
While cautioning that a court should start with

"the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not

to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and

manifest purpose of Congress,"' ls the Court has stated that the "ulti-

mate touchstone"'' 1 9 in determining whether federal and state law so

conflict that the latter is without effect is the intent of Congress:' 9°
Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." In the absence
of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if
that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field "'as to make reasonable the infer19 1
ence that Congress left no room for the State to supplement it."'

More specifically, state law is implicitly preempted "where it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,' or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.""' 92 On a number of occasions, courts have considered
whether federal statutes or regulations expressly or implicitly preempted the states from effecting takings of property through their eminent domain powers. 93
An illustrative case is Hayfield Northern Railroad Co. v. Chicago &

North Western TransportationCo.' 94 In Hayfield, a group of shippers
sought to make use of a Minnesota statute to condemn a segment of a
railroad line that a railroad abandoned in accordance with the procedures set forth under the Staggers Rail Act, a federal statute.' 5 In

187. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
188. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947)).
189. ld. (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
190. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
191. Id (citations omitted).
192. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (citations omitted).
193. See, e.g., Hayfield N. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622,
637 (1984) (holding that the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 did not preempt condemnation
of abandoned rail property); Union Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 103 F.3d 62, 65-67 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Rail Passenger Service Act preempted the application of Missouri condemnation law); City of Stilwell v.
Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 79 F.3d 1038, 1046 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
Rural Electrification Act ("REA") did not preempt condemnation of electric facilities and service rights in area annexed by city); City of Morgan City v. South La. Elec.
Coop. Ass'n, 31 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the REA did preempt
condemnation); City of Madison v. Bear Creek Water Ass'n, 816 F.2d 1057, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act preempted condemnation of rural water utility); Grace Geothermal Corp. v. Northern
Cal. Power Agency, 619 F. Supp. 964, 973 (N.D. Cal.) (finding that the plaintiff was
likely to prevail on the merits on the issue of whether the Geothermal Steam Act of
1970 preempted condemnation of geothermal leases that the plaintiff had acquired
from the federal government under the Act), affd mien., 770 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1985).
194. 467 U.S. 622 (1984).
195. See id. at 625-26.
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holding that the federal act did not preempt the use of the state eminent domain power, the Court noted, first, that the "case present[ed]
no issue of express pre-emption," because nothing on the face of the
federal act "explicitly indicates whether Congress intended to preempt state authority over rail property after the [Interstate Commerce] Commission has authorized its abandonment. 1 96 Turning
next to the issue of implicit preemption, the Court concluded, first,
that federal regulation was not so pervasive as to leave no room for
application of the state's eminent domain power, noting that "state
law normally governs the condemnation of ordinary real property,"
and that the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction over the
subject property normally would terminate upon its issuance of a certificate of abandonment. 197 Second, the Court reasoned that application of the state law would not frustrate the purposes of the federal
act, inasmuch as (1) condemnation would occur only after the abandonment had been effected; and (2) the federal act did not confer
upon the railroad an absolute right to shift property from the abandoned line to its highest-valued use. 98
Congress's intent to preempt the states from effecting takings of
patent, copyright, and trademark licenses, by contrast, is both explicit
and emphatic, particularly in light of the Remedy Clarification Acts.
As noted above, these acts clearly evidence an intent to subject the
states to liability "in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entit[ies],"' 199 and to render the states amenable to
all of the remedies available under federal intellectual property law,
including injunctive relief, enhanced damages, and attorney's fees. 2 °°
Authorizing the courts to impose remedies of this nature upon the
states, however, is inconsistent with allowing the states to "take" intellectual property licenses upon the payment of just compensation. The
remedy for a taking of private property for public use is "just compensation," meaning the "full monetary equivalent of the property
taken."'2 0' While there are different methods for determining precisely what "just compensation" entails, 2 1 it generally does not in196. Id. at 627-28.
197. Id. at 632-34.
198. See id. at 634-36.
199. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994); accord 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994); 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) (1994).
200. See 7 U.S.C. § 2570 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1122; 17 U.S.C. § 511; 35 U.S.C. § 296.
201. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. (Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases), 419 U.S. 102, 150 (1974) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970)); see also Kwall, supra note 161, at 718 (noting that the Supreme Court has
defined just compensation as "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken," which should place claimant "in as good [a] position pecuniarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken" (quoting United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943))).
202. See Kwall, supra note 161, at 719-21 (discussing fair market value, value to
owner, and income capitalization methods).
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dude injunctive relief,20 3 punitive or other enhanced damages,-0 or
attorney's fees. 20 5 In the context of the Remedy Clarification Acts, in
other words, Congress appears to have "create[d] an entitlement to be
free of takings in lieu of the constitutional requirement of compensation for takings."''
Congress's intent to subject the states to suit "in the same manner
and to the same extent" as private entities precludes the takings theory for another reason as well. One of the principal features of American intellectual property law is to eschew the use of compulsory
licenses in all but a few circumstances. 7 One of those few circumstances is set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which obligates the federal
government (but not the states) to pay "reasonable and entire compensation" for the manufacture or use of a patented invention or
copyrighted work without the owner's permission.3' Permitting the
states to exercise their eminent domain powers over intellectual property therefore would allow the states in effect to "take" compulsory
licenses in situations in which private individuals are not allowed to do
203. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984). Of course, if the
state refuses or is otherwise unable to pay just compensation, injunctive relief may be
available to remedy the now-unconstitutional taking of property. See, e.g., Eastern
Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 2144-46 (1998) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
("[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act 'allows individuals threatened with a taking to
seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before
potentially uncompensable damages are sustained."' (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15 (1978))). As explained infra at
note 213, however, we are aware of no authority holding that, under these circumstances, injunctive relief is available directly against the state itself, as opposed to
against the individual state actor under the doctrine of Er parte Young.
204. At least some states, however, do permit the awarding of punitive damages in
inverse condemnation actions in some very limited circumstances. See, e.g., Beachy v.
Board of Aviation Comm'rs, 699 F. Supp. 742, 746 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (stating that
"proof of tortious or malicious conduct warrants punitive damages in inverse condemnation action" under Indiana law (citing Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 363
N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ind. App. 1977))).
205. See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979) (stating that
"'[a]ttorneys' fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation"' to
which a property owner is entitled in an inverse condemnation action (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930))). The Court left open the possibility, however, that there might be some unusual circumstances under which an exception to
this rule would be recognized. See id. at 203 & n.2 (noting that in United States v.Lee,
360 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1966), the court awarded property owner expenses incurred in
having land survey made, where government had misrepresented amount of land to
be taken).
206. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (addressing the issue of whether federal agricultural statutes create such an entitlement).
207. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 31, at 1614 n.137 (listing the circumstances
under which U.S. law requires an intellectual property owner to license another to use
her property).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)-(b) (1994). The courts sometimes characterize this statute
as creating a compulsory licensing scheme. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States,
729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (stating that, in a § 1498(a) action, "the United States is not in the position of an ordinary infringer, but rather a
compulsory, nonexclusive licensee").
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so. Of course, if Congress desires only to enforce the Takings Clause
against the states, it can permit the states to take compulsory licenses
in exchange for compensation-perhaps simply by making § 1498 applicable to them. By forbidding the unauthorized use of intellectual
property, however, even when accompanied by an offer of just compensation, the Remedy Clarification Acts reflect quite a different
intent.
Finally, while the Court in Seminole Tribe did not address the constitutionality of the Remedy Clarification Acts and therefore cannot
be expected to have thought the matter through to its full extent,
some dicta in the opinion suggests that the majority may agree with
the preemption analysis sketched above. As noted above, in response
to Justice Stevens's argument in dissent that the holding in Seminole
Tribe would leave claimants with no remedy against states that violated their rights under federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust
laws, 0 9 the majority asserted that "several avenues remain open for
ensuring state compliance with federal law," including "obtain[ing] injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law."2''
As the Court had earlier
noted in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., however, injunctive relief "is
not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be
brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking." ' Thus, if
state uses of intellectual property are properly viewed as takings of
private property for which just compensation is due, an Ex parte
Young order enjoining the state actor from effecting the taking may be
inappropriate. 1 2 While not determinative, the Court's observation
that it may be proper to enjoin a state actor from the unauthorized use
of a copyright suggests that the Court reads the federal intellectual
property laws as preempting the states from exercising their power of
eminent domain over federal intellectual property rights.2 "3
209. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
210. See id. at 72 n.16 (citation omitted).
211. 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (footnote and citation omitted).
212. This assumes that a state forum would be available in which to litigate an intellectual property takings claim against the state. At least two state courts have concluded that states may litigate intellectual property takings claims, notwithstanding
the federal courts' exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over some intellectual property infringement actions, because a takings claim is not the same as an infringement
action. See supra note 161 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 220-23 and
accompanying text (discussing this issue in greater detail).
213. We agree that the Remedy Clarification Acts' conversion into a wrongful act
of what would otherwise be a lawful exercise of the eminent domain power (as long as
just compensation were paid) should leave the aggrieved intellectual property owner
with a cause of action under Ex parte Young to sue the state actor who effects the
taking for prospective injunctive relief. Cf Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct.
2028, 2044 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (suggesting that, where state officials acting without valid authority effect takings of property, a federal court "could
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In short, Congress's intent in enacting the intellectual property laws
in general and the Remedy Clarification Acts in particular is about as
clear as one can ever be: namely, that states making unauthorized
uses of intellectual property are not exercising their lawful power of
eminent domain over property, but rather are in violation of federal
law. Given this reality, it is difficult to perceive how Congress could
forbid the states from effecting takings of intellectual property and, at
the same time, claim that it is enforcing the Takings Clause, which
allows the states to effect takings upon payment of just compensation.
B.

Ripeness

Even if our preemption analysis were incorrect, two other reasons
would seriously weaken the takings theory as a basis for sustaining the
Remedy Clarification Acts. For purposes of this and the following
section, therefore, we shall assume-contrary to the preceding analysis-that the Remedy Clarification Acts can be viewed as in some way
find that the officials had no right to remain in possession, thus conveying all the
incidents of ownership to the plaintiff, while not formally divesting the State of its
title"); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) (stating that federal -officials may
become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their authority," and that -where they
unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattels," an aggrieved owner "isnot
relegated to the Court of Claims to recover a money judgment"); Perry v. United
States, 28 Fed. Cl. 82, 85 (1993) (stating that "unlawful action... cannot be the predicate for a fifth amendment takings claim").
In correspondence, Professor Paul Heald agrees with us that the Remedy Clarification Acts render any exercise by the states of their power of eminent domain over
federal intellectual property rights unlawful, but he argues that the aggrieved owner
then has the option of suing either the state actor for injunctive relief or the state itself
for just compensation. E-mail from Paul J. Heald, Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, to Thomas F. Cotter 1 (Apr. 6, 1998) (on file with
authors). If so, then perhaps the Remedy Clarification Acts can be viewed as an
effort to enforce a Fifth Amendment right to exercise this option. Compare First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19
(1987) (holding that a property owner is entitled to just compensation for temporary
regulatory taking that the property owner suffers prior to state court's invalidation of
regulation), with id at 315 (stating that Fifth Amendment is designed "to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking"). It is
not clear to us, however, that the Fifth Amendment does compel this option, when the
state effects a taking that is forbidden by federal statute (as opposed to one that is
permitted as long as accompanied by just compensation). Those cases in which courts
have held that federal legislation preempts a state's eminent domain power, see supra
note 193, do not address this issue. Nor is this surprising; if the aggrieved property
owners in those cases had been satisfied with recovering just compensation in lieu of
injunctive relief, there would have been no need for the courts to decide the preemption issue. Moreover, even if Heald is correct in asserting that the owner has a constitutional right to opt for suing the state itself when the state effects a taking that is
forbidden by federal law, at most this theory would render the state liable for just
compensation, and not for the full panoply of remedies provided for under federal
law. A significant portion of the Remedy Clarification Acts would be gutted. See
infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's power to enforce,
not expand, rights guaranteed under Fourteenth Amendment section 1); notes 439-46
and accompanying text (discussing severability). There also would be a significant
ripeness issue, which we discuss in the following section.
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attempting to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. Even so,

Congress arguably lacks the power to enforce the Takings Clause in
the manner contemplated by the Remedy Clarification Acts, because
in most instances to do so would render the states amenable to suit in
federal court at a point in time before any violation of the Takings
Clause has occurred.
Our argument in this section is based upon Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,21 4 a case in which the

Supreme Court held that a takings claim against a state entity does
not ripen until the claimant has first sought compensation in a state
forum.115 The logic behind this rule is straightforward: because the
Fifth Amendment (as incorporated into the Fourteenth) does not prohibit the states from effecting takings for public use, but rather only
from doing so without at least a subsequent 2 16 payment of just com-

pensation, the state does not violate the Amendment until it refuses to
pay.

17

Thus, as long as a state renders itself amenable to inverse con-

214. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
215. See id. at 195. In Williamson Planning Commission, the plaintiff filed an action in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a state regional
planning commission's application of certain zoning regulations effected a taking of its
property without just compensation. See id. at 182. The Supreme Court ultimately
held that the claim was "premature," id. at 185, because the plaintiff had neither "obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for
obtaining just compensation." Id. at 186. The Court explained that, if the state affords
"an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process
'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the Government' for a taking ..... Id. at 194-95 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1013, 1018 n.21 (1984)). Noting that Tennessee law generally permits property owners to file inverse condemnation actions against the appropriate government
entity, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe until it either had
used that procedure or showed the procedure to be unavailable or inadequate. See id.
at 196-97.
216. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016 ("The Fifth Amendment does not require that
compensation precede the taking." (citing Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104
(1932))).
217. See Williamson Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (stating that "because
the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied"); id. at 194-95 (stating that,
if a government provides adequate process for obtaining compensation and that process yields compensation, the "property owner 'has no claim against the Government'
for a taking" (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21)); id. at 195 (finding that,
where the state "provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has
used the procedure and been denied just compensation"); id. (noting that the owner
"has not suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such compensation"); id. (observing that the Just
Compensation Clause does not require pretaking process or compensation).
We note, however, that there is some tension between the preceding statements and
the Court's more recent description of Williamson Planning Commission as establishing "prudential hurdles to a regulatory taking claim brought against a state entity in
federal court." Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-65
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demnation actions in its own courts, a property owner wishing to challenge a regulation that diminishes the value of his property cannot
assert that the state has taken that property without just compensation
until the state court rejects his claim.21 8 Affording intellectual property owners a federal forum without first requiring them to proceed
with an inverse condemnation action in state court (where such an
action is available) therefore cannot be justified on the basis of the
Takings Clause; until the state court has entered judgment against the
owner, no violation has occurred. 9
We can conceive of two possible objections to this line of reasoning,
though neither one appears very promising. The first is that no state
forum is available-at least not in cases involving alleged takings of
patents and copyrights-because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all actions arising under the Patent and Copyright
Acts.' 0 The fact that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
claims for patent and copyright infringement, however, cannot mean
that the states are powerless to hear cases involving an alleged taking
of a patent or copyright, if (as we are assuming for purposes of this
section) states retain some power of eminent domain over federal intellectual property rights. State courts have jurisdiction to hear other
types of cases incidentally involving the patent and copyright laws
(1997). If the Court really means that Williamson Planning Commission's requirement that the owner first seek compensation from the state is only prudential, rather
than constitutionally mandated, then presumably Congress could modify or even
eliminate this requirement. In Suitun, the Court's use of the term "prudential" to
describe this aspect of Williamson Planning Commission is dictum, however, and may
have been intended only to contrast the ripeness issue in Williamson County with
ripeness as an aspect of the case or controversy requirement of Article III. See id. at
1664 n.7 (contrasting the two); id at 1665 (noting the requirement that the owner first
seek compensation from the state "stems from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that
only takings without 'just compensation' infringe that Amendment"); see also Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the FederalCourts, 48 Vand. L Rev.
1, 16 (1995) (arguing that "the case or controversy portion of the ordinary ripeness
test is altered in takings cases in a way that incorporates a modified exhaustion
requirement").
218. See Williamson Planning Comn'n, 473 U.S. at 196-97. One effect of the Williamson Planning Commission rule is to remove most state takings claims from the
lower federal courts. If a property owner files an inverse condemnation claim in state
court and that court enters a judgment that the conduct at issue does not effect a
taking for which just compensation is due, the owner then may be barred under principles of res judicata, full faith and credit, or abstention, from challenging that conduct in federal court. See Stein, supra note 217, at 92-97.
219. Some courts also have concluded that, under Williamson Planning Commission, a federal takings suit is not ripe until the claimant has pursued a state court
appeal as well. See, e.g., Belvedere Military Corp. v. County of Palm Beach, 845 F.
Supp. 877, 878 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff must "litigate his claim in state
court to an unsuccessful conclusion").
220. See supra notes 35, 59 and accompanying text. State courts have concurrent
subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under the Lanham Act, however. See
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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(such as claims for breach of patent and copyright licenses), 221 after
all; and, as noted above, at least two courts have expressly held that
state courts have jurisdiction over patent takings claims.2 2 More importantly, the objection is circular, resting as it does upon the following three premises: (1) Congress may provide a federal remedy
against the states, but only with regard to state action that violates the
Fifth Amendment; (2) the states violate the Amendment when,
among other things, they fail to "provide[ ] an adequate procedure for
seeking just compensation";2 2 3 and (3) the reason the states fail to
provide an adequate procedure is that Congress has forbidden them
from doing so. Surely Congress cannot create federal jurisdiction premised on the inadequacy of a state forum, where Congress itself is the
source of the inadequacy!
A second objection would be that Congress's power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce those portions of the Bill of
Rights, such as the Takings Clause, that are incorporated into section
1 of the Amendment includes the authority to render states amenable
to suit in federal court at an earlier time than otherwise would be the
case under Williamson County Planning Commission. This argument
is difficult to sustain, however, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.2 4 At issue in City of Boerne was the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"),225 a federal
law enacted in response to the Court's 1990 decision in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 2 6 In Smith, the
Court had held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
does not preclude states from enforcing neutral, generally applicable
laws against persons whose religious beliefs compel them to disobey
those laws.22 7 RFRA purported to overrule Smith by requiring fed-

eral and state governments that substantially burden free exercise to
prove that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.22 8 In City
221. See 8 Chisum, supra note 38, § 21.02[l], at 21-27 to -28 (noting that state courts
have jurisdiction to entertain claims for breach of patent licenses and agreements to
assign patent rights); 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 157, § 12:01[A][2], at 12-16 to
-19 (noting that state courts have jurisdiction to entertain claims for breach of contracts involving copyrights).
222. See supra note 161.
223. Williamson PlanningComm'n, 473 U.S. at 195.
224. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
226. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-62, 2169-70
(discussing the legislative history of RFRA).
227. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90. Specifically, the Smith plaintiffs alleged that the
State of Oregon had violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause by denying
them unemployment compensation benefits after their employer, a drug rehabilitation organization, had fired them for using peyote in connection with a Native American religious ceremony. Id. at 874.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (defining scope of substantive right); id.
§ 2000bb-2(1) (defining "government" to include federal and state governments).
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of Boerne, however, the Court held that Congress had overstepped its
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting a
statute the purpose of which was to enlarge, rather than to enforce,
the scope of the Free Exercise right." 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that
"Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment"" 0 to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States"' 1 or to "expand[ ] the rights
contained in section 1. " 2 Emphasizing that Congress's power under
section 5 "extends only to 'enforc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, ' ' 233 the Court reasoned that one "does not enAt the
force a constitutional right by changing what the right is."'
same time, the Court acknowledged that the distinction between
measures that merely enforce the Amendment by remedying or
preventing unconstitutional conduct, on the one hand, and "measures
that make a substantive change in the governing law," on the other,
can be a fine one. 35 The Court further noted that "Congress must
have wide latitude in determining where [that distinction] lies. '' 2 6 As
examples of the former type of measures, the Court cited the voting
rights legislation at issue in cases such as Soutlh Carolina v. Katzenbach,2 7 in which the Court upheld Congress's power (under a parallel
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment) to combat racial discrimination against would-be voters by prohibiting literacy tests, even though
these tests were not facially unconstitutional.? 8 Therefore, under
some circumstances, a broad prohibition that incidentally forbids conduct that is not itself unconstitutional may be permissible, if problems
of detection or enforcement threaten to render a more finely-tuned
approach ineffective. 9 The Court nevertheless stressed that "[wihile
229. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170-72.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

2167.
2164.
2168.
2164.

235. Id.
236. Id
237. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
238. See id. at 337; see also City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (discussing South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)); id. at 2167 (stating that, in cases involving voting rights legislation, the Court has "continued to acknowledge the necessity of
using strong remedial and preventive measures to respond to the widespread and per-

sisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's history of racial discrimination").
239. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 ("Legislation which deters or remedies

constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."'
(quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976))); id. at 2167 (stating that remedies at issue in Katzenbach "were deemed necessary given the ineffectiveness of the
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preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there
must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved.""24 With regard to RFRA, however, the Court concluded
that the means Congress had chosen-prohibiting all state action burdening religious practice, absent a compelling state interest-were
vastly disproportionate to the end of deterring the much more limited
set of acts that remain unconstitutional under Smith, such as singling
out members of a religious group for discriminatory treatment. 41
Given Congress's transparent desire not to enforce, but rather to alter, the substantive law as announced by the Court, RFRA could not
be justified as a lawful exercise of section 5 power.
Whatever its merits may be, the rule announced in City of Boerne
makes it very difficult to find support for the Remedy Clarification
Acts in the Takings Clause.24 2 If we are correct in reading Williamson
County as standing for the proposition that a state does not violate the
Takings Clause until it has refused to provide just compensation, 243 it
is difficult to perceive how an effort on the part of Congress to render
states liable before they have made such a refusal can be anything but
an enlargement, rather than a means of enforcing, the Clause. Nor do
the chosen "means" of permitting such claims to be litigated in federal
court without an initial showing that the state forum is inadequate
appear congruent with the "end" of enforcing the Clause. There certainly has been no outbreak of state court decisions declining to award
compensation for state "takings" of intellectual property. Indeed, as
we noted above, if we assume that the states have the power to effect
takings of federal intellectual property rights, it would appear that
they also have the power to hear claims for just compensation in their
own courts, and at least two of them have so held.24 4 Finally, while it
may serve the interests of uniformity and convenience to relegate all
such cases to the federal courts in the first instance, we do not see how
these policy considerations can overcome Williamson County's apparent holding that a violation of the Fifth Amendment does not occur
until the state has refused compensation. Absent proof that the right
to just compensation can be preserved only by initial recourse to the
existing voting rights laws and the slow costly character of case-by-case litigation"
(citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-15, 328))).
240. Id. at 2169; see also id. at 2164 (stating that "[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end," and that without such connection "legislation may become substantive in operation and effect").
241. See id. at 2168-72; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating an ordinance on the ground that it
targeted a religious group).
242. For contrasting views on City of Boerne, see generally Symposium, Reflections
on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 597 (1998) (discussing the impact
and significance of City of Boerne).
243. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 161.
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federal courts, the constitutionality of the Remedy Clarification Acts
remains dubious.
C. Authorization
Our final argument against the takings justification for the Remedy
Clarification Acts is based upon the requirement that, for a taking to
implicate the Fifth Amendment, it must be "duly authorized by
law."2 45 As we shall demonstrate, some common uses of intellectual
property by state actors do not implicate the Fifth Amendment due to
lack of sufficient legislative authorization, and the takings theory
therefore cannot support an attempt to penalize the states for these
uses.

Our argument in this section derives from the proposition that the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition of uncompensated takings "is directed
against the government, and not against individual or public officers
proceeding without the authority of legislative enactment. ' 46 A deprivation that is unauthorized "expressly or by necessary implication"
by some act of the legislature therefore "is not the act of the government."247 Just how specific the legislative authorization must be in
order to give rise to a takings claim is somewhat unclear, however. A
case that highlights two different approaches to this issue is Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger.24 The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district
court against the United States Secretary of Defense and other officials, alleging that the Department's operation of a military training
center on the plaintiffs' land in Honduras violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.2 4 9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit addressed whether the plaintiffs had stated a takings
claim-and if so, whether they should have asserted that claim in the
United States Court of Claims instead of in the district court. 5° The
court, sitting en banc, stated:
Not all illegal acts of government officials are considered unauthorized for the purpose of determining the government's liability to
pay compensation under the Tucker Act. The question in each case
is whether the defendants' actions are substantially in compliance
245. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (footnote omitted).
246. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910).
247. Id at 336; see also Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102,
127 n.16 (1974) (quoting Hooe, 218 U.S. at 336); Southern Cal. Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 634 F.2d 521, 525 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (stating that sufficient authorization will be
found if government action flows from "the good faith implementation of a Congressional Act" (quoting NBH Land Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 317, 319 (Ct. CI.
1978))); cf. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (declining to "decide what types of
official authorization, if any, are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth
Amendment").
248. 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
249. See Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1505.
250. See id. at 1522-24.
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with the powers granted to them by congressional statute or constitutional provision. Recovery under the Tucker Act has been permitted when a taking by an officer is the natural consequence of
congressionally approved measures or the result of an exercise of
discretion granted to an official for the implementation of a congressional statute.251
The majority nevertheless concluded that, on the record before it, it
was impossible to determine whether the defendants' alleged conduct
was in substantial compliance with their lawful powers.2
Reaching the opposing conclusion on the takings issue, then-Judge
Scalia cited a series of Supreme Court decisions-including Larson v.
54
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,253 United States v. Causby,
and PortsmouthHarborLand & Hotel Co. v. United States255-for the
proposition that, if a taking occurs while a government official "is acting within the normal scope of his duties (a concept akin to, though
not as liberal as, the 'scope of employment' test for application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior in private law)," the litigant is required to pursue a takings claim in the Court of Claims, "unless Congress has expressed a positive intent to prevent the taking or to
exclude governmental liability. ' 256 Under this analysis, the question
(which Judge Scalia answered in the affirmative) was whether the defendants were "authorized to conduct military training exercises
abroad, with no specific limitation upon trespass or unlawful taking in
the process. 2 57 Even under Judge Scalia's reading of the case law,
however, some acts within the scope of a state actor's employment
would not constitute takings compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Such acts include some unlawful or tortious conduct, as well as
some acts contrary to the employer's directions, though motivated in
part to serve the employer's interests.258
To illustrate how these approaches to the authorization issue affect
the application of the Remedy Clarification Acts, consider the following examples of an office manager of a state agency who unlawfully
copies software for agency use, or a state university professor who
authorizes the reproduction of infringing "coursepacks" for use by her
251. Id. at 1523 (footnote omitted).
252. See id. at 1523-24.
253. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
254. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
255. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
256. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added), rev'd, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).

257. Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1555 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
258. In some circumstances, a tort committed by an employee may be deemed
within the scope of her employment, even if her conduct is (1) contrary to the employer's instructions and (2) a tortious or criminal act. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 230-231 (1958).
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students." 9 Under the majority's approach in Ramirez de Arellano,
these acts are attributable to the state only if they are "the natural
consequence of [legislatively] approved measures or the result of an
exercise of discretion granted to an official for the implementation of'
state law."6 Proving one or the other of these conditions in the context of two such low-level state employees is likely to be extremely
difficult, but in the absence of such proof the state has not effected a
taking. On the other hand, under the Scalia approach, if the state has
adopted a policy specifically prohibiting its employees from engaging
in these activities without the consent of the intellectual property
owner, the activities arguably lack the authorization necessary for
them to be classified as takings, even if they would be deemed within
the scope of employment for purposes of general tort law. 26 1 In effect,
the state may be able to shield itself from liability through the adoption of artfully worded policy statements. To the extent that the
Remedy Clarification Acts purport to provide a federal cause of action against the states for such uses of intellectual property by their
employees-as we believe they do 262 -they cannot be sustained under
the Fifth Amendment theory.
III.

DUE PROcEss THEORY

In the previous section we concluded that there are several reasons

why the Remedy Clarification Acts cannot be sustained as an exercise
of congressional power to enforce the Takings Clause, as incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Another
potential source of support for the abrogation of state immunity, however, is the Due Process Clause by itself, in either its procedural or
substantive aspect."6 In its procedural aspect, the Clause, which pro259. With regard to the latter example, see Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1156 (1997), which held that reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works in
coursepacks was not privileged under the fair use doctrine; Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
260. Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1523 (footnote omitted).
261. See supra note 258.
262. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
263. If a state's infringement of intellectual property is a proper exercise of its eminent domain power under the Takings Clause, then a procedural due process claim
becomes meaningless, and a substantive due process claim is almost impossible to
prove. One of the few constitutional provisions that discusses remedies, the Takings
Clause establishes that the redress for a state's taking of property is "just compensation," which has been interpreted to mean post-deprivation compensation. Thus, by
constitutional definition, post-deprivation compensation is all the process that is due,
and any violation of this requirement would be a Takings Clause violation rather than

a Due Process Clause violation. In addition, the arbitrary and irrational conduct necessary to maintain a substantive due process claim is likely absent where there has
been a taking, because a proper exercise of eminent domain generally must proceed
for a public purpose. It follows that where a state's unauthorized use of intellectual
property is not a taking because it is not for a public purpose, then both substantive
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hibits the states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, 2 64 guarantees that states may not
deprive individuals of their life, liberty, or property in the absence of
adequate procedure. 6 5 The main purposes of the procedure are to
avoid erroneous deprivations by requiring some form of hearing to
detect mistakes in the state's decision making and to maintain an appearance of fairness for persons aggrieved by state action. 66 Substantive due process, on the other hand, is concerned with the substance of
the state action, protecting against arbitrary
and irrational govern267
ment action that "shocks the conscience.
In section A, we consider procedural due process as a source of
congressional power for enacting the Remedy Clarification Acts, first
examining whether most unauthorized uses of intellectual property
under the federal intellectual property laws constitute violations of
procedural due process under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. and then analyzing whether the Remedy Clarification Acts are
valid enforcement mechanisms under section 5 of the Amendment. In
section B, we repeat the analysis for substantive due process.
A.

ProceduralDue Process

To sustain a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements. First, she must have a recognizable life, liberty,
or property interest. 68 Second, state action must have deprived the
plaintiff of that interest.2 69 Third, the deprivation must have occurred
without due process of law. 7 ° In the following subsections we discuss
these elements in turn, as applied to the context of intellectual property infringement.
1. Life, Liberty, or Property
An early theory of the Due Process Clause held that the words "life,
liberty, or property" should be read together, and that they collecand procedural due process avenues of relief are available, and that where it is not a
taking for some other reason but there is a public purpose, then only a procedural due
process claim may be pursued.
264. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
265. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (describing the protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 13.1, at 487-88 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining
difference between procedural and substantive due process); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., FundamentalProperty Rights, 85 Geo. L.J. 555, 607 (1997) (analyzing substantive
and procedural due process in the context of the takings and contracts clauses).
266. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 57-59 (1976).
267. See infra notes 407-33 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 271-94 and accompanying text.
269. See infra notes 295-334 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 335-80 and accompanying text.
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tively encompass an individual's right to be free from governmental
intrusion and oppression in almost every aspect of life. 7t This view
succumbed to the current interpretation, which is that each of these
three terms should be read separately, and that each one circumscribes a finite number of rights bearing a close relationship to the

particular term describing them.272 Inasmuch as the life interest is
never at issue in the intellectual property context, and on the heuristic
assumption that the liberty interest would be implicated only in rare
cases,2 73 we focus our attention here mainly on the property interest.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 27 4 the Supreme Court explained that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is
a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.... It is a purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives ....275 The Court has established that a statute creates a

property right entitled to due process protection when the statute restricts the state's discretion to act with regard to the property

271. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 265, § 13.2, at 488 & n.1.
272. See id. § 13.2, at 488 & n.1-2 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property", 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 415 (1977), for arguments in support of this approach and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), as the earliest example of
this approach in the case law).
273. Many of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are applicable against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment through the liberty prong of the Due Process
Clause, see Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 265, § 11.6, at 382-85, or perhaps, as some
have argued, through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 Yale LJ. 1193, 1233-38 (1992).
The First Amendment right not to associate may be implicated where a state-related
entity uses an invention, copyrighted work, or trademark, without the owner's consent, to further a state interest of which the owner does not approve. This may be the
analytical equivalent of forcing an individual to contribute money to support such
activities, which was barred as a violation of the First Amendment in Keller r. State
Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1990), and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 431 U.S. 209,
234-36 (1977). The right not to associate in commercial activities generally receives
little constitutional protection, but if the action of some state-related body requires an
individual to fund or assist in causes involving political or ideological beliefs, then it is
subject to heightened scrutiny. There may be some instances of unauthorized use of
intellectual property that fall into the latter category. One example might be the use
of patented DNA cloning technology to clone human beings for medical or military
purposes, to which the patent owner is opposed. A less-Brave New World and more
mundane example might be the use of a copyrighted work or trademark to promote a
family planning campaign. The use of intellectual property for these purposes would
be the exception, however, and not the rule. Moreover, this protection of the right
not to associate applies primarily against state-related entities such as labor unions
and bar associations, not against "traditional government agencies and officials,"
which have the power to tax for virtually any cause. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 12-13.
Thus, it is unlikely that the liberty interest would support the application of the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts against the states.
274. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
275. Id. at 576-77 (citations and footnote omitted).
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owner.2 76 Because Congress clearly has attempted to place limits on
the state's discretion to act with regard to intellectual property, one
might assume that all of the rights under the federal intellectual property laws are cognizable property interests for procedural due process
purposes. Indeed, historically the due process definition of property
has been broader than its counterpart in takings jurisprudence, 27 7 including within its ambit many statutory rights and entitlements. 78
Since Seminole Tribe, however, it has become necessary to examine
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment more closely-because if

Congress can create rights through federal legislation passed pursuant
to its Article I powers and then use the Due Process Clause to enforce
those [property] rights against the states, it seems that the Seminole
Tribe holding would be eviscerated.2

79

Thus, two possible views of

property under the Due Process Clause emerge.
A traditional view might construe "property" under the Due Process Clause rather narrowly, probably encompassing only those forms
of intellectual property that past law has recognized as property for
takings, due process, or other purposes. Because courts have long

hailed patents as property, 280 a patent probably would qualify for due
process protection under this narrow definition. Arguably, rights
against copyright and trademark infringement would also qualify.
With respect to trademarks, the Supreme Court said as early as 1879

that:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to
the exclusion of use by all other persons ... is a property right for
the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at
law.... This exclusive right was not created by the act of Congress,
and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole
system of Trade-Mark property and the civil remedies for its protec-

276. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985). In
Loudermill, the Court held that a statute which provides mandatory procedures for
the taking of a right triggers due process protection, rejecting the "bitter with the
sweet" approach, espoused by a plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54
(1974), under which the procedures required in the statute would be exclusive because providing more protective process would be viewed as an expansion of the substantive right itself. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540.
277. See Vizquez, supra note 101, at 1745-46 n.281.
278. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (disability benefits);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
279. For a similar argument, see Vizquez, supra note 101, at 1744. VAzquez refers
to this potentiality as "the abrogation reductio." Id.
280. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945)
("That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and
by government, has long been settled." (footnote omitted)); James v. Campbell, 104
U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (comparing a patent for an invention to a patent for land for
Takings Clause purposes).
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tion existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force
since its passage.8'

In addition, as one of us demonstrates in a companion article:
[t]he factors the [Supreme] Court cited in [Ruckelshaus v.] Monsanto as reasons for concluding that trade secrets are propertyincluding the fact that they are assignable and may form the res of a
trust, as well as the Court's prior characterization of other intangible interests such as liens and contract rights as property-apply
with equal force to copyrights and, to a lesser extent, to
trademarks. 282

While the traditional view of property likely encompasses rights
against patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, it may not embrace recently added "fringe" intellectual property rights, such as
moral rights under the Copyright Act' or certain unfair competition
rights under the Lanham Act.' 4 By contrast, a broader view of property under the Due Process Clause might suggest that these liberal

provisions do confer legitimate property interests under the Due Process Clause. Several of these provisions, including those involving

moral rights, trademark dilution (both blurring and tarnishment), and
product disparagement, aim primarily to protect the reputation of an
artist or business."8 Reputation, which may be characterized as either
a liberty- or property-type interest, 6 has been on uncertain constitutional footing since Paul v. Davis.287 In Paul, the Supreme Court held
that a sheriff's placing the plaintiffs name on a list of "active shoplifters" and distributing the list to local shops did not violate the Due
281. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
282. Cotter, supra note 171, at 566 (footnotes omitted). The reason trademarks
may be property "to a lesser extent" is that, while they are assignable, a proper assignment is conditional upon a transfer of goodwill. See id. No similar restriction on
transfer exists with regard to patents and copyrights.
283. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Unlike many traditional property interests, moral rights may not be assigned "and (in the case of joint works) may
be waived by one joint author on behalf of all other joint authors without the others'
consent." Cotter, supra note 171, at 567 (footnote omitted) (discussing moral rights as
property interests for purposes of determining whether federal government infringements of moral rights are takings).
284. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Arguably, if unfair competition
rights against product disparagement and trademark dilution count as property rights
for due process purposes, so do a large number of other federal statutory entitlements. See Cotter, supra note 171, at 568 (suggesting that a "principled distinction"
may be drawn between a property right against trademark infringement and one
against trademark dilution for takings purposes).
285. See Cotter, supra note 56, at 6-15 (tracing the philosophical antecedents of
these protections).
286. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (discussing personal reputation as a potential property or liberty interest), with Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (holding that injury to one's reputation, when accompanied
by an additional loss of liberty, constitutes a cognizable interest for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, but not specifying whether it is a liberty or property interest).
287. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Process Clause, even though there had been no hearing to resolve the
issue of plaintiff's guilt prior to distribution of the list.28 8 The decision
usually is cited for the proposition that there is no cognizable liberty
or property interest in reputation without some additional injury. 8 9
Commentators have criticized the Paul opinion on the ground that
it has "little historical or analytical basis, because Anglo-American
law has long placed a value on the individual's right to one's good
reputation.12 9 For this reason, some scholars have offered a revisionist interpretation of Paul. They suggest that because the state law of
defamation would have afforded the plaintiff in Paul a tort remedy,
the case simply establishes that, assuming there is a valid interest in
reputation (perhaps without deciding the issue), the possibility of a
postdeprivation tort suit satisfies due process minima.2 9i
If this reading of Paul is correct, then even the reputation-based
federal intellectual property rights may be cognizable interests under
the Due Process Clause. And even if the former interpretation is the
proper one, violation of these rights still may implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment, if accompanied by an additional injury. In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau,292 the Court held that the state's labeling the plaintiff a
drunkard implicated a valid interest where the defamatory statement
resulted in the plaintiff's being denied the legal right to purchase alcohol. 93 Thus, if an intellectual property owner has suffered some further injury such as reduced licensability of her property, or if the
contested state action also has injured a more traditional-and hence
cognizable-interest conferred by another provision of the intellectual
288. See id. at 711-12.
289. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (citing Paul for the proposition that there is no constitutional protection for the interest in reputation); Kelly v.
Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the requirement imposed by Paul is that "a liberty interest" requires more than mere injury to
reputation); Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1995) (positing that "damage to an individual's reputation ... accompanied by an infringement of some other
interest, is actionable"); Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Paul
stressed that defamation alone did not constitute deprivation of a protected liberty
interest."); Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson, and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. Rev. 813, 824 (1987) ("In Paul v. Davis the
Court found that there existed no liberty interest in being free from defamatory remarks made by the government."); see also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d
282, 288 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on Paul in holding that an individual's right against
misappropriation of her name guaranteed by the Lanham Act is not a property right
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
290. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 265, § 13.5, at 521 (footnote omitted); Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); see Krotoszynski, supra
note 265, at 610-11.
291. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701-02 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a postdeprivation remedy may be constitutionally sufficient
where an invasion of a property interest is involved).
292. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
293. See id. at 434-36.
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property laws, then perhaps even these "fringe" rights would enjoy
constitutional property status.29 4
2.

Deprivation

Assuming that most forms of intellectual property are property for
purposes of the Due Process Clause, the next element of a due process
claim addresses whether a state actor has deprived the owner of that
interest. Aside from the plethora of issues involved in the doctrine of
state action,

95 which

we choose to ignore at our peril in the interest of

economy, the most important issue here is whether the alleged conduct constitutes a deprivation. Several categories of conduct emerge
from the caselaw. On a spectrum, these roughly discrete categories
look something like this: (1) simple negligence; (2) gross negligence
or recklessness; (3) predictable negligence; (4) intentional conduct,
unauthorized by the state; and (5) intentional conduct, authorized by
the state.

First, we will consider property loss caused by a state official's mere

negligence. In Parratt v. Taylor, 9 6 the Supreme Court held that a

state actor's negligent conduct, which resulted in the loss of a prisoner's hobby kit valued at $23.50, constituted a deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause.297 That decision was overturned
294. It is questionable whether reduced licensability of intellectual property would
suffice to turn the loss of a reputation-based right into a constitutionally cognizable
interest after Siegert. In Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234, the Court held that there is no constitutionally protected interest in reputation even if damage to reputation almost certainly would "impair ... future employment prospects." The Court stated that the
petitioner in Paul also had "alleged serious impairment of his future employment opportunities as well as other harm [and that m]ost defamation plaintiffs attempt to
show some sort of special damage and out-of-pocket loss which flows from the injury
to their reputation." Id. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive, however,
holding that "so long as such damage flows from the injury caused by the defendant to
a plaintiff's reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but it is not recoverable in a Bivens action." Id; cf Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 655
(9th Cir. 1992) (allowing remedy under state law but not federal law for business and
reputation losses alone in a case involving alleged child molestation); Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing a state tort claim but not a federal
claim in an action brought against insurance officials). But cfi Texas v. Thompson, 70
F.3d 390, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a constitutional claim may exist).
Thompson held that while "[a]llegations of damage to one's reputation or the impairment of future employment prospects fail to state a claim of denial of a constitutional
right," id at 392, an injury to reputation may state a constitutional claim if accompanied by a showing that officers "sought to remove or significantly alter" the plaintiffs
liberty or property interests in operation of a business. Id. at 393 (quoting San Jacinto
Say. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1991)).
295. See generally Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 265, §§ 12.1-12.5, at 452-486 (discussing the state action doctrine).
296. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
297. See id, at 543-44. The Court went on to hold that the deprivation did not
violate the Due Process Clause because state tort remedies provided adequate
postdeprivation process. See id.
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only five years later in Daniels v. Williams,"' in which the Court held
that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent

act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
property.

' 299

The Court's opinion drew largely from Justice Powell's

concurring opinion in Parratt,which "criticized the [Parratt]majority
for 'passing over' th[e] important question of the state of mind required to constitute a 'deprivation' of property"3 ' and emphasized

that "we should not 'open the federal courts to lawsuits where there
has been no affirmative abuse of power.' 3 1 The Daniels Court
wanted to avoid "'mak[ing] ... the Fourteenth Amendment a font of
tort law... ,",302 perhaps being motivated by federalism concerns? 3
At the other end of the spectrum from negligence, it is well estab-

lished that intentional conduct by state actors, whether or not authorized by the state, implicates procedural due process. Hudson v.

Palmer,30 4 which dealt with intentional, unauthorized conduct, and

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,305 which involved conduct pursuant
298. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
299. Id. at 328.
300. Id. at 330 (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring)).
301. Id. (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 548-49 (Powell, J., concurring)).
302. Id. at 332 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
303. See generally Brown, supra note 289 (suggesting that federalism concerns influenced the Supreme Court's decisions in Parratt,Hudson, and Daniels and criticizing the approach taken in those cases).
304. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson, the plaintiff was a prisoner who alleged that
prison attendants intentionally destroyed his property during a search of his cell in
violation of his due process rights. See id. at 520. The Court found that the prisoner
was entitled to due process protection, but, analogizing to the random, unpredictable
nature of the deprivation in Parratt,ruled that only a postdeprivation remedy was
required. See id. at 533.
305. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Logan was an employee discharged from Zimmerman
Brush Company, allegedly because of a physical handicap which made it impossible to
adequately perform his duties. See id. at 426. Logan petitioned the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission ("Commission") in accordance with the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), which prohibited "employment discrimination
on the basis of 'physical ... handicap unrelated to ability,"' id. at 424 (quoting Il1.
Rev. Stat. ch. 48, 853(a) (1979)), and established a scheme for reviewing allegations
of such discrimination. See id. The statute required the Commission to hold a
factfinding hearing within 120 days. See id. (citing I11.Rev. Stat. Ch. 48, 858(b)).
The Commission, however, failed to convene the conference within the 120-day period, and Zimmerman Brush made a motion to dismiss, which eventually was granted
by the Illinois Supreme Court. See id. at 426-28. Logan appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that his due process rights would be violated if the Commission would not hear his claim. See id. at 427-28. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that Logan had a right to be heard by the Commission, notwithstanding available
state tort remedies. See id. at 435-38. The Court distinguished Parratt,in which the
Court had held that a postdeprivation tort remedy sufficed for due process purposes.
See id. at 435-36. The Court noted that "[i]n Parratt,the Court emphasized that it was
dealing with 'a tortious loss of... property as a result of a random and unauthorized
act by a state employee ... ".' id. at 435-36 (quoting Parratt,451 U.S. at 541), while
"[h]ere. in contrast, it is the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property
interest, by operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely
conference .... " Id. at 436.
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to a scheme explicitly authorized by the state, illustrate that while the
authorization factor weighs heavily in deciding what process is due, 0 6
it does not influence the determination of whether a deprivation has
occurred.
Thus, on one end of the spectrum, it is clear that merely negligent
conduct does not trigger application of the Due Process Clause. On
the other end, it is certain that intentional conduct does invoke a due
process analysis. As often happens, however, the middle categories
have fallen into the gray abyss. While Daniels made it clear that
merely negligent acts by state officials do not implicate the Due Process Clause, it did not address whether the same would be true in a
case involving gross negligence or recklessness. 0 7 That issue remains
unresolved. 08 Moreover, the Court did not speculate about whether
conduct which is negligent but predictable could constitute a deprivation. Because the latter type of conduct probably accounts for a fairly
large portion of intellectual property infringements,3 9 the resolution
of this issue is crucial to determining the constitutionality of the Remedy Clarification Acts as a congressional attempt to protect procedural due process rights. Thus, we will explore this issue in some
detail.
The Court first espoused the notion of predictability as a salient
feature of a state actor's conduct in Zinermon v. Burch.1 ° In
Zinermon, respondent Burch alleged that his confinement in a mental
hospital by state officials while he was incompetent deprived him of
his liberty without due process of law.3 1 I Florida law provided guidelines for both voluntary and involuntary placement in a mental health
facility.312 Burch apparently was admitted under the voluntary provisions, not having been afforded the safeguards required under state
law for involuntary placement.3 '3 The voluntary commitment provision required "'express and informed consent,' 31 4 which included the
306. In Hudson, the Court held that an adequate postdeprivation remedy satisfies

due process requirements for intentional but unauthorized deprivations in which the
state is unable to control the conduct of a state actor in advance. See Hudson, 468
U.S. at 533. By contrast, in Logan, the Court ruled that most deprivations resulting

from a state statutory system require predeprivation process. See Logan, 455 U.S. at
436-37.
307. See Daniels,474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) ("[Tjhis case affords us no occasion to
consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or
'gross negligence,' is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.").

308. "[Ilt is an unresolved issue whether an allegation of gross negligence or recklessness suffices [to support a due process claim]." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
143 (1990) (citation omitted).
309. See infra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
310. 494 U.S. at 136.

311. See id.at 114-15.
312. See id. at 122-23.
313. See id. at 123-24.
314. Id. at 133 (quoting Fla. Stat. ch. 394.465(1)(a) (1981) (currently codified at Fla.

Stat. ch. 394.4625 (1998))).
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ability both to "understand any proffered 'explanation and disclosure
of the subject matter' of the forms that person is asked to sign," and to
"'make a knowing and willful decision' whether to consent to admis'
sion." 315
The Court found that "[i]t is hardly unforeseeable that a person requesting treatment for mental illness might be incapable of
informed consent, and that state officials with the power to admit patients might take their apparent willingness to be admitted at face
value and not initiate involuntary placement procedures. '3 16 Accordingly, the Court held that respondent's procedural due process rights
were violated because "the statutes do not direct any member of the
facility staff to determine whether a person is competent to give consent, nor to initiate the involuntary placement procedure for every incompetent patient."3 1' 7 Significantly, the Court did not characterize
the staff's conduct in Zinermon as either negligent or intentional. Instead, the Court strove to separate the case from both Hudson, which
involved an intentional and unauthorized deprivation of property, and
Parratt, which involved a negligent deprivation of property. The
Court explained that "the reasoning of Parrattand Hudson emphasizes the State's inability to provide predeprivation process because of
the random and unpredictable nature of the deprivation."3 ' Thus,
Zinermon seems to stand for the proposition that due process requires
predeprivation procedures for predictable conduct causing loss of or
injury to an individual's liberty.
While the above summary may suggest a lack of ambiguity in
Zinermon, the case is capable of both narrow and expansive interpretations. The narrow view derives from the Court's description of predictability. The Court noted that, under the facts in Zinermon, "[a]ny
erroneous deprivation will occur, if at all, at a specific, predictable
point in the admission process-when a patient is given admission
forms to sign."3' 19 By contrast, the Court emphasized that in Parratt,
"[w]hile [the state] could anticipate that prison employees would occasionally lose property through negligence, it certainly 'cannot predict
precisely when the loss will occur."' 32 ° Similarly, the Court stated that
in Hudson, "the State might be able to predict that guards occasionally will harass or persecute prisoners they dislike, but cannot 'know
when such deprivations will occur.' '321 Thus, a narrow view of
Zinermon would conclude that it applies only when individual deprivations are predictable with respect to time and place, which occurs
315. Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. ch. 394.455(22) (1981) (currently codified at Fla Stat. ch.
394.455(9) (1998))).
316. Id. at 136.
317. Id. at 135.
318. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 136.
320. Id. (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruded in part by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-32 (1986)).
321. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
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only where an established statutory scheme authorizes or directs the
state actor to effect the deprivation.
The expansive view, on the other hand, holds simply that Zinermon
applies when deprivations are predictable enough in a general sense
to enable the state to establish some safeguards to protect against
their occurrence. This interpretation draws support from statements
throughout the opinion indicating the Court's aversion to drawing
bright lines around categories of conduct and its desire instead to view
conduct at a higher level of abstraction, with an eye toward judging
the state's ability to provide process. For example, in addressing
Burch's allegation that the "petitioners 'knew or should have known'
that he was incompetent, and nonetheless admitted him as a voluntary
patient in 'willful, wanton, and reckless disregard' of his constitutional
rights," the Court responded that "[ulnderstood in context, the allegation means only that petitioners disregarded their duty to ensure that
the proper procedures were followed ... ."I'

The Court also looked

at Parrattthrough the lens of process, neither as a strict rule unto itself
nor "an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but rather [as] an
application of that test to the unusual case in which one of the variables in the Mathews equation-the value of predeprivation safeguards-is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at
issue." 2 Applying the Mathews test to the facts in Zinermon, the
Court treated predictability as a proxy for the state's ability to provide
324
procedures that would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.
Thus, the expansive view of Zinermon reveals a functional approach
in which the keystone for determining whether state conduct has
caused a deprivation is whether the state practicably could have provided some form of process that would have reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation. Under either the narrow or expansive view,
Zinermon appears to modify the rule, enunciated in Daniels, that a
deprivation caused by mere negligence never activates the Due Process Clause: where the deprivation is predictable such that the state
can provide predeprivation process, the Due Process Clause is triggered. 3" The difference between the two views is in the level of pre322. Id. at 137.
323. Id at 129. For a discussion of the Mathews balancing test, see infra text accompanying notes 337-40.
324. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132-37.
325. But see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1717-18 (1998) (stating
that "the due process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing

liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm," such that, for
example, "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold
of constitutional due process"). The issue before the Court, however, was whether a

police officer's deliberate indifference to (or reckless disregard for) life when conducting a high-speed pursuit that results in death so "shocks the conscience" as to
constitute a violation of substantive due process, see id. at 1717-18, not whether such
conduct was predictable within the meaning of Zinernon. In concluding that the officer's conduct does not violate due process unless the harm caused is intentional, the
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dictability that is required. The narrow view would require that the

deprivation be predictable in a specific sense, that is, predictable with
respect to time and place, which arguably would occur only where the

state has laws in place directing the state official to effect the deprivation as in Zinermon. The expansive view, on the other hand, would
require procedural safeguards to be implemented to the extent possible where the deprivations are predictable enough in a general sense
to make implementation of at least some procedures practicable for
the state.
Although most of the circuit courts that have decided cases under
Zinermon apparently adopt the narrow view,326 weetikt
think that the ex-

pansive view may be preferable at least as applied to federal rights.
The narrow view would discourage states from establishing any protective procedures at all, because if state actors act pursuant to an
established statutory scheme, and their negligence causes a deprivation of property, the state will be liable. If there is no statutory
scheme in place, however, the state would not be liable. This disincentive is not especially problematic for state-created rights because

states may define property as they please by limiting or not limiting
the discretion of state actors to act with regard to the property
owner. 32 7 States do not have the power to define federally-created
property rights, however, and thus they should not be permitted to

decide unilaterally
when they can be held liable for violation of a fed3 28
eral right.
Zinermon applies with equal force in the intellectual property context. First, it is unreasonable to suggest that Zinermon applies only to
liberty, as opposed to property, interests. Just as the Court has' re32 9
jected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges '
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it also has shunned the division
between liberty and property. In response to Burch's claim that
Court stressed that "[r]ules of due process are not ... subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory," and that what might constitute a due process violation in
one context-for example, deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's medical
needs-"may not be so patently egregious in another." Id. at 1718. Although the
specific issue before the Court was one of substantive, not procedural, due process,
the Court's observation that a particular mental state may implicate the Due Process
Clause under some circumstances and not others suggests, as we argue above, that
Zinermon can be reconciled with Daniels. It sheds no light, however, on whether the
broad or narrow interpretation of Zinermon is correct.
326. See Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 341-42 (1st Cir. 1992); Caine v. Hardy, 943
F.2d 1406, 1413 (5th Cir. 1991); Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1052-53, modified
per curiam, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990); Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 930-31
(4th Cir. 1990); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1400-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
327. See supra note 276.
328. See Vizquez, supra note 101, at 1758-59 (apparently assuming, without much
analysis of Zinermon, that the expansive view is the correct one).
329. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).
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"postdeprivation tort remedies are never constitutionally adequate for
a deprivation of liberty, as opposed to property," the Zinermon Court
stated, "[w]e. ..do not find support in precedent for a categorical
330
distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of property."
In addition, many have argued that because "[bloth ['liberty' and
'property'] interests, together with 'life,' appear in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments[,] they enjoy equal
dignity as a textual matter and therefore also deserve equal dignity in
the scope of their application. ' 331 Because we find these arguments
persuasive, we conclude that Zinermon applies to property interests as
well as to liberty interests.
Second, one may envision intellectual property deprivations analogous to those implicating Zinermon. Even under the narrow view,
there may be rare instances in which an informal policy or custom
regarding the use of intellectual property satisfies the requirement
that deprivations be authorized by the state so as to render them predictable in a specific sense. Moreover, under the expansive view,
many state uses of intellectual property are predictable enough in a
general sense that the state's establishment of predeprivation procedures is feasible and would decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation.
First, the states' need for intellectual property is ubiquitous: state en332
tities frequently require the use of patented devices or processes;
university professors generally depend on copyrighted materials in
their teaching and research; 333 state agencies need patented or copyrighted computer software on a daily basis; and state agencies occasionally wish to convert copyrighted or trademarked expressions into
330. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131-32 (1990) ("[T]he dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one." (quoting Lynch v. Household

Fimance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972))).
331. Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 557; see also William Van Alstyne, Cracks in
"The New Property": Adjudicative Due Processin the Administrative State, 62 Cornell

L. Rev. 445, 453-56 (1977) (noting that the Due Process Clause equates the importance of life, liberty, and property).
332. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 727-

29 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing Florida's installation of a patented tidal flow system for
improving water quality without the patent holder's authorization); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 332 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing the patent holder's allegation that
California's automobile emissions testing process infringed upon her patent); College
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 402
(D.N.J. 1996) (discussing a bank's claim that a body of the State of Florida infringed

upon its patent on "a method to provide a return adequate to meet payouts for funding the uncertain cost of a college education at a future date"), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d
Cir. 1997), cert granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149), and aff'd,
148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No.

98-531).
333. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Sers., 99 F.3d 1381,
1385-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the defendant violated the Copyright

Act by copying excerpts of copyrighted works and selling them in "coursepacks" to
university students), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
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slogans to popularize state programs.33 4 Second, a state actor often
may suspect that the property is protected. Nevertheless, in the absence of any procedures a state actor may fail to determine whether it
actually is protected and, if so, the extent of the protection for the
purpose of judging whether the state's intended use of the property
would be an infringing use. Third, even intentional deprivations are
predictable at least to some extent, especially where there is a pattern
of this type of conduct or where state actors are in positions to abuse
their discretion to cause a deprivation. Moreover, it is likely that the
state can implement at least some predeprivation procedures for state
officials to follow each time they need to use potentially protected
property which would curb these unauthorized uses of intellectual
property. The precise procedures required by the Due Process Clause
in this context are the focus of the next section.
3.

Due Process of Law

After determining that the property interest at stake is cognizable
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the state has deprived the
owner of the property, the last inquiry is whether the deprivation occurred without due process of law. Generally, this third element implicitly necessitates determining the minimal procedures required by
due process for a given deprivation. Our focus here is to discover
what procedural safeguards due process requires for deprivations of
intellectual property so that we can analyze whether the states' comprehensive liability under the federal intellectual property laws is a
valid exercise of congressional power to vindicate those due process
rights.
The Court has held that "due process, unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances, ' 335 but that generally "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.' 33 6 In Mathews v. Eldridge,33 7 the
Court established a balancing test for determining what process is due
in a particular case. Under this test, a court must weigh the following
three factors: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) "the risk of an erro334. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 616-22 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey's claim that Utah's Division of Travel Development had diluted its
trademark "THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" by using the slogan "THE
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" to attract tourists); Woelffer v. Happy States of
Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing claimant's allegation that
Illinois' use of slogan "Illinois, you put me in a happy state" constituted a Lanham
Act violation).
335. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961) (internal quotations omitted).
336. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
337. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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neous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) the governmental interest involved and the burden
that would
be placed on the government if the safeguards are
338
required.
This test has been applied in numerous contexts since Mathews.
The results have been mixed, but the Court generally has held that the
Due Process Clause requires "some kind of a hearing" prior to a deprivation of liberty or property, 339 recognizing an exception only where
"'[t]he necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of
providing any predeprivation process' may mean that a postdeprivation remedy is constitutionally adequate."3 " 0 The following four cases,
each representing the Mathews test applied to a different type of conduct by a state actor, are relevant to our determination of what procedures are necessary in the context of intellectual property
infringements by state actors. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,3"
the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires a predeprivation
hearing where the state actor who caused the deprivation acted pursuant to an established state statutory scheme that authorized the conduct.' 2 The Court found that additional safeguards would have
reduced the risk of erroneous deprivations, and that, because the state
had abandoned a practice previously within the statutory scheme directing state officials, it could not argue that adding steps to the procedure would be overly burdensome.3" 3 By contrast, in Hudson v.
Palmer,'44 the Court determined that a postdeprivation tort remedy
suffices where a state actor acts without authority and with intent to
work a deprivation, because the state could not predict or prevent the
' ~ In
state official's intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property."
Zinermon v. Burch, the Court held that some predeprivation process
is due in cases of predictable deprivations. 6 Finally, as we saw
above, the Court held in Daniels v. Williams that a deprivation resulting from merely negligent conduct, like that involved in Parratt,does
'
not invoke due process protection at all.3 47

338. Id. at 335.
339. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 678 (1977) (discussing the need for administrative safeguards where corporal punishment is contemplated by school authorities); Board of Regents of State Col-

leges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n.7 (1972) (stating that, except in extraordinary
situations, a prior hearing is required before the deprivation of a protected interest).
340. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981),
overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)).
341. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).

342. See id. at 436.
343. See id. at 434-36 & n.10.
344. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

345. See id. at 533.
346. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136-39 (1990).
347. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
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Applying these cases to deprivations of intellectual property, it appears that if the expansive view of Zinermon discussed in the previous
section is correct, then many intellectual property infringements are
predictable deprivations requiring predeprivation process under
Zinermon.3 4 8 If the narrow interpretation is correct, however, and
many of these deprivations do not fall under Zinermon's authority,
then due process requirements must be addressed in a piecemeal fashion, because the deprivations caused by negligence would not implicate the Due Process Clause at all, and the procedures required for
deprivations caused by intentional conduct depend on whether the
conduct was authorized or unauthorized.34 9 The distinction between

the narrow and expansive views will become more important later
when we turn our attention to the issue of whether, under the Due
Process Clause, Congress can subject the states to comprehensive liability under the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts. For now we will
assume that some predeprivation process is required, and we return to
the Mathews balancing test to determine what that process must
entail.
Under the first element of the Mathews test, it cannot be denied
that intellectual property is a weighty private interest. Many businesses are formed around the owner's single patented invention; many
individuals have gained fame and fortune on the basis of one copyrighted song or book; and many famous companies would be headless
without their trademark (Coca-Cola, for example). When the state
uses intellectual property without the consent of the owner, it essentially deprives the owner of the right to licensing revenue. Although
not equivalent to depriving the owner of the entire benefit of the
property, this deprivation is no less deserving of due process protection, because the right to license is often one of the most profitable
attributes of intellectual property ownership. °
The second Mathews factor inquires into the sufficiency of current
procedures to avoid erroneous deprivations and the efficacy of adding
or substituting other procedures. The third factor considers the burden on the government of implementing those additions or substitutes. States often have few or no procedures in place to protect
against "erroneous" or "unlawful" deprivations of intellectual property.3 While state agencies may declare a general policy of nonin348. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
350. Due process has no analogue to the takings law rule that the state affects a
regulatory taking only when it has rendered the property almost valueless. See Tibe,
supra note 176, § 9-3, at 593 n.3 (indicating that the Court has allowed government
regulation to diminish the value of property by more than 75% without requiring
compensation).
351. By contrast, they usually have strict rules regarding the ownership of intellectual property created by state employees. See, e.g., University of Florida Intellectual
Property Policy (n.d.) (on file with authors) (discussing these rules). In addition,
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fringement, Zinermon suggests that this is not enough to satisfy the
dictates of procedural due process.
To illustrate, suppose that a state announced, "It is the policy of the
state of X that state employees may not use any form of legally protected intellectual property without the owner's consent." When an
employee infringes intellectual property rights anyway, the state might
answer simply that the employee's conduct was a random and unauthorized departure from state policy. It seems that this is the type of
scenario that divided the Zinermon Court. The dissent apparently
would have allowed a state to make this argument and thus would
have required only postdeprivation process.352 The majority, however, (at least under the expansive view) probably would characterize
the employee's conduct not as a departure from established state procedure, but rather as an exercise of "broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power" to act within the interstices of a porous policy,
requiring additional predeprivation safeguards.353 Thus, if a state's
failure to adequately fill in the gaps of its policy results in failure to
provide the required predeprivation process,"s procedural due process rights have been violated.
While procedural due process seems to require more at the
predeprivation stage than a feckless statement of a policy of non-infringement, it probably does not mandate a full-blown trial-type hearing because such a requirement would place an enormous
administrative burden on states.355 Rather, the Mathews test requires
that we balance the benefits and burdens of procedure to reach a compromise. Interestingly, the benefits and burdens, and thus also the
states also may place provisions regarding the ownership of intellectual property de-

veloped by state employees in employment contracts. See generally 8 Chisum, supra
note 38, §§ 22.01, 22.02 (discussing ownership of patent rights).
352. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113. 143-44 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The unauthorized and wrongful character of the departure from established state
practice makes additional procedures an 'impracticable' means of preventing the
deprivation.").
353. Id. at 136. The majority reached this issue of its own volition, because, as the
dissent pointed out, Burch did not allege that the state's procedures were inadequate.
See id. at 140 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Rather, he claimed that the state officials
"knew or should have known" that he was incompetent, and nonetheless admitted
him as a voluntary patient in wiUful, wanton, and reckless disregard of his constitutional rights. Id. The majority summarily dismissed pleading formalities, however,
stating that "[i]t is immaterial whether the due process violation Burch alleges is best
described as arising from petitioners' failure to comply with state procedures for admitting involuntary patients, or from the absence of a specific requirement that petitioners determine whether a patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission."
Id. at 135-36.
354. Theoretically, the state actor could provide the predeprivation process on her
own without an established procedure. This is unlikely to occur, but if it does there is
no due process violation.
355. The only context in which the Court has required a predeprivation hearing
resembling a trial was in a state's termination of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970).
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process that is due, vary with the type of intellectual property at issue

and the circumstances surrounding each deprivation. Here we simply
make some suggestions for predeprivation safeguards amounting to
less than a hearing which we think could be implemented in most, but
probably not all, cases of intellectual property deprivation.
When dealing with patents, the risk of erroneous deprivation with
virtually nonexistent state procedures is high, and the burden of providing additional procedure is low. First, it is possible for the potential
user of a patented invention not to know that it is patented. Sometimes the U.S. Patent Office number that generally is affixed to a material invention or its container is absent." 6 In addition, patented
processes cannot be affixed with a number. 7 Moreover, once a state
has made, used, or sold a patented invention or process, there are few
defenses to a claim of patent infringement. Most notably, unlike
under trade secret law, independent development is not a defense

under the Patent Act. 8 Thus, absent predeprivation procedures, the
risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial. It may be fairly easy,
however, to implement some safeguards. If states are required to con-

tact the patent owner-if the owner is known-or to conduct a search
of patent office records, the state could determine whether the inven-

tion is patented, and, if it is, the scope of the patent "claims" in order
to make an educated guess as
to whether the state's intended use
35 9
would constitute infringement.
356. Section 287(a) of the Patent Act provides:
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United
States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented
article into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is
patented, either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation
"pat.", together with the number of the patent, or when, from the character
of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein
one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (Supp. II 1996).
It is interesting to note, however, that the failure to affix this notice precludes an
award of damages "except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement
and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only
for infringement occurring after such notice." Id.
357. According to an attorney in the General Counsel's office at the University of
Florida, process cases account for a fairly substantial percentage of patent infringement claims against universities because university employees often are not aware
that a process is patented. Telephone Interview with Barbara Wingo, Attorney in the
General Counsel's Office at the University of Florida (Mar. 13, 1998).
358. While intent is not required to hold an infringer liable for compensatory damages under the Patent Act, courts usually will award enhanced damages only in cases
of willful infringement. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. There are a few
very narrow exceptions or defenses to patent infringement, including, for example,
the experimental use doctrine. See 5 Chisum, supra note 38, §16.03[1], at 16-100 to
-02.
359. It is also important to note that requiring this procedure may protect the state
as well. A state entity or official occasionally purchases an invention from a seller
assuming that it either is not patented or that the seller owns the patent. If another
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Copyrighted works, on the other hand, entail very different considerations. The Copyright Act's broad coverage, regardless of registration with the Copyright Office, of all "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression ''3 ° means that infringement may occur each time a state actor copies or distributes a manuscript, an e-mail message, or other copyrighted work without the
owner's permission. The "fair use" defense curtails the scope of copyright protection, providing that no infringement occurs when a copyrighted work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment ....
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research ...
361
Even with the Copyright Act's provision for fair use, the risk of
erroneous deprivation may be fairly high. Requiring an additional
layer of predeprivation process might not materially decrease the risk
of erroneous deprivation, however. Many state actors may be aware
that most works are protected. The familiar copyright symbol adorns
many copyrighted works, and although we may see the copyright symbol less frequently since Congress deleted it as a prerequisite to protection in 1989,362 any resulting difficulty in identifying copyrighted
works in the future may be counteracted by (1) the Copyright Act's
broad coverage; and (2) growing public awareness of copyright law
brought about by its pervasiveness in daily life.36 3 Thus, requiring the

state to conduct a search of Copyright Office records, for example,
may not yield any real benefit because the search would reveal only
whether the work has been registered, and not any additional information indicating whether the state's intended use of the work would
constitute infringement. 3 4 Arguably, the only way to make that determination would be to hold some kind of hearing in which lawyers
later claims to own the patent, then the state could become a party to protracted
patent litigation.
Of course, there are some limitations on the application of these principles. It

would be unreasonable to expect a state to determine the patent status of every component of a complex machine such as a computer. The prospect of a mere end user of

a machine that incorporates a patented component being sued is, however, probably
very remote.
360. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
361. 1d § 107. See generally 4 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 157, § 13.05, at 14952 (discussing the defense of fair use).

362. The current rule is that the notice of copyright may be placed on a work, and
that "[i]f a notice of copyright ... appears on the published copy or copies to which a

defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to
such a defendant's interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages.. . ." 17 U.S.C. § 401(d).
363. Examples of this pervasiveness include familiar library and copy center rules,
FBI warnings on rented videocassettes, and highly publicized Hollywood copyright
litigation. See, e.g., Sandra Torry, Fact, Fiction and Fairness: The Copyright Wars
Surge, Wash. Post, June 19, 1995, at F7.

364. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 31, at 1675-78 (discussing the costs and benefits
associated with searching the copyright registry).
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and expert witnesses discuss technical issues such as whether the fair
use defense applies. Requiring such a hearing or a Copyright Office
search every time a state wanted to make copies would, however, pose
an inordinate burden for the benefits to be achieved. Thus, perhaps a
state policy against copyright infringement, coupled with training for
state actors on what constitutes infringement and fair use, provides all
the predeprivation process that is required for the state's use of a
copyrighted work.
Finally, due process may require a state to contact the owner of a
trademark-if the owner is known-or to conduct a search of trademark office records before using a mark that it believes may be protected.365 If the mark is well-known, the risk of erroneous deprivation
is high, because many uses of the mark probably would be deemed
infringing or diluting?66 That risk can be greatly reduced by requiring
the state to contact the owner, if known, or else to conduct a trademark search in order to learn the identity of the person with whom the
state must negotiate.3 67 If the state has no reason initially to know
whether the mark is protected, however, the analysis is somewhat
more complicated. On the one hand, the risk of unlawful deprivation
may be only moderate for the use of marks that are nonfamous, because (for example) the state's use may not be "likely to cause confusion" as to the source of the goods,3 6 8 the trademark's geographical

scope may be limited, or the trademark may have been abandoned;
many such marks also may be unregistered and therefore may elude
search efforts. On the other hand, states probably do not need to use
marks as frequently as private entities do, in which case the minimal
burden of requiring the state to conduct a pre-use search of Trademark Office records whenever it does need to use a mark may be commensurate with the decrease in the risk of erroneous deprivation.
Once the state has provided predeprivation process, one of three
things will occur: the state will decide not to use the intellectual property after all; the state will decide to use the property and obtain the
proper license or consent; or the state will use the property without
obtaining the proper license or consent. Only the third course of ac365. The state could either conduct the search itself or hire a trademark search firm
to search the federal registry and other relevant registries and databases to check the
availability of a particular mark. See id.; see also International Star Class Yacht Racing
Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that
the district court erred in failing to consider the limited extent of defendant Hilfiger's
search in determining whether Hilfiger had committed willful infringement).
366. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Abandonment of the mark is a
defense to a suit for infringement of a registered mark, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(2)
(West 1997), but if a mark is famous, it is unlikely to have been abandoned. See id.
§ 1125(c) (listing factors a court may consider in determining whether a trademark is
famous).
367. We assume that most "well-known" marks probably would be registered with
the Patent and Trademark Office.
368. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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tion further implicates the Due Process Clause. It suggests the need
for a postdeprivation remedy in cases where the state's use of the
property constitutes an infringement.3 69
In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,

the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires a state
to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the payment of an
unconstitutional tax where the state has established a system of sanctions to encourage businesses to pay the tax before challenging it,
thereby denying a predeprivation opportunity to contest the validity
of the tax.370 In addition, some commentators have argued that the
369. It should be noted that there may be some situations in which predeprivation
process suffices without the opportunity for a postdeprivation remedy for losses that
occur despite the predeprivation safeguards. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110-11
(1994) (citing and affirming McKesson for the proposition that in the exaction of
taxes, a state "has the flexibility to maintain an exclusively predeprivation remedial
scheme, so long as that scheme is 'clear and certain.'... [A state is also allowed] to
maintain an exclusively postdeprivation regime ... or a hybrid regime"); McKesson
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36-37 (1990)
(holding that a state may choose to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation
process, or both in the exaction of taxes); Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trustees, 978
F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a postdeprivation process was not required
where a hearing "akin to a trial" was held prior to petitioner's termination from employment). This argument becomes more valid as the predeprivation process tends
toward a complete trial-like hearing. Because requiring states to provide comprehensive predeprivation process would be overly burdensome, however, the Mathews balancing test generally permits states to provide some minimal predeprivation process
coupled with an opportunity for a postdeprivation remedy for losses that occur despite the safeguards. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46
(1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-49 (1976); cf Collyer v. Darling, 98
F.3d 211, 223 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that all the process afforded, including both
predeprivation and postdeprivation process, should be considered together to determine whether the Due Process Clause has been satisfied), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2439
(1997); Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 901 (8th
Cir. 1994) (same); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1990) (same). The
predeprivation safeguards that we suggest are minimal and would be inadequate in
most cases to satisfy due process requirements if they are not followed by an opportunity for a postdeprivation remedy. There is one situation, however, in which the state
may not be required to provide a postdeprivation remedy following this process. If
the state establishes the required predeprivation procedures pursuant to Zinermon,
and then a state officer negligently infringes intellectual property rights anyway, it
seems that the Due Process Clause would not be implicated and would not require a
postdeprivation remedy. Recall that Zinermon would create an exception to the Daniels rule that negligent deprivations of property do not implicate the Due Process
Clause when it is predictable that negligent deprivations will occur in the absence of
adequate predeprivation process. See supra text accompanying notes 319-25. In that
case, Zinermon requires a state to establish predeprivation safeguards, but it says
nothing about postdeprivation remedies for deprivations that occur despite the
safeguards.
370. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 51. The Court held that the state had the option of
providing predeprivation process, postdeprivation process, or both. See supra note
369. This holding probably does not cut against the conclusion that predeprivation
process is required in the intellectual property context, however, because the Court
emphasized the state's special need for flexibility in the tax context, stating, "\Ve have
already noted that States have a legitimate interest in sound fiscal planning and that
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Parratt line of cases had established the necessity of an adequate

postdeprivation remedy several years before McKesson.37 ' Thus, it
seems fairly clear that the Due Process Clause requires an "adequate

postdeprivation remedy" for an erroneous deprivation of property.
In the intellectual property context, an "adequate postdeprivation
remedy" would require the state to make available an action for compensation for the use of the intellectual property. It is unclear
whether the cause of action provided must be against the state itself or
whether one against the state officer would be adequate.3 72 What is
clear, however, is that the property owner must have some meaningful

remedy. Thus, it appears that the state cannot shield itself from suit
by invoking sovereign immunity and simultaneously shield its officers
by providing them with official immunity.373 The action may take the
form of a tort suit or some other state cause of action in state court.3 7"
Interestingly, the intellectual property owner could not bring a § 1983
action for a violation of procedural due process at this point (even in
state court), because until the state has had an opportunity and has
refused to provide a postdeprivation remedy, there can be no procedural due process violation.3 75
this interest is sufficiently weighty to allow States to withhold predeprivation relief for
allegedly unlawful tax assessments, providing postdeprivation relief only." McKesson,
496 U.S. at 50.
371. See, e.g, Brown, supra note 289, at 829 & n.118 (discussing Parratt'sforeshadowing of a requirement to exhaust procedural due process); Rodney A. Smolla, The
Displacementof FederalDue Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor
and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 831, 873-877 (arguing
that under Paratt postdeprivation process could give adequate compensation).
372. Compare Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984) (apparently deciding
that Virginia law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy because it allowed "'a State employee [to] be held liable for his intentional torts" (quoting Elder v.
Holland, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372-73 (Va. 1967))), with McKesson, 496 U.S. at 37-39 (apparently requiring a postdeprivation remedy against the state itself).
373. See Brown, supra note 289, at 838-39; Smolla, supra note 371, at 875-77. Vfizquez has argued, however, that McKesson should be reinterpreted to require a damage remedy against the state actor personally under the Supremacy Clause rather than
one against the state under the Due Process Clause, because only a comprehensive
system of state employee liability reconciles Eleventh Amendment and rule-of-law
principles. See Vdzquez, supra note 101, at 1770-806. If Vizquez's view prevails and
individuals are entitled to a postdeprivation remedy only from the state actor personally, the existing availability of a postdeprivation remedy against the state official in
federal court may virtually obviate the need for states to provide an opportunity for a
postdeprivation remedy against the state official in state court.
374. Congress may have to repeal the exclusive federal jurisdiction statutes in order
for the state court to exercise jurisdiction, but this should not present a major obstacle. See supra text accompanying notes 220-23.
375. See Smolla, supra note 371, at 874-75. This conclusion flows from the Court's
holding that an adequate postdeprivation remedy satisfies due process requirements
in some circumstances. See id. As we shall see, this postponement of a procedural due
process cause of action, which essentially acts as an exhaustion requirement, may cut
against a finding of congressional power under the procedural due process clause to
pass the Remedy Clarification Acts, which expose states to comprehensive liability
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With respect to the amount of compensation that must be awarded,
the state may have substantial latitude to decide what compensation is
due as a matter of due process. 376 Parrattheld that a postdeprivation
remedy need not be as generous as a civil rights action remedy to be
constitutionally adequate. 3" McKesson, additionally, gave the state
broad discretion to fashion the postdeprivation monetary remedy.3,
Because of the speculative nature of appraising the value of intellectual property at the postinfringement stage,3 79 the state's freedom to
shape an appropriate remedy under Parrattand McKesson may manifest itself in the valuation of the property. Possible definitions of infringement damages include (1) the actual value of a license (if
known); (2) the reasonable value of a license; (3) the plaintiff's lost
profits; or (4) the defendant's profits. 3 1 Thus, due process may permit a state to choose any one of these models to apply in all cases or
potentially to elect to pay only the least of these four amounts as calculated in any individual case.
4. Implications
In the previous section, we discussed intellectual property infringement as a violation of procedural due process. Because the applicability and dictates of due process vary from case to case, we concluded
that some, but probably not all, of a state's unauthorized uses of intellectual property would be unconstitutional under the procedural
prong of the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, we found that constitutionally-required remedies for most of these deprivations are rather
modest. In this section, we seek to find whether the Remedy Clarification Acts, which expose states to comprehensive liability under the
Patent Act, Copyright Act, and Lanham Act, are legitimate exercises
of congressional power, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to vindicate procedural due process rights in intellectual
property.
The first possible objection to the Remedy Clarification Acts is that
they may expose states to liability for violations of rights that do not
protect "property" under the Due Process Clause. In the previous
section, we outlined two possible views of "property" under the proceunder federal intellectual property laws as of the time of infringement. See infra text
accompanying notes 391-97.
376. By contrast, under a takings analysis, it is fairly clear that "just compensation"
would equate to the value of a license to use the intellectual property, because that is
what has been "taken." See supra Part II.
377. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527. 543-44 (1981).
378. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18, 39-41 (1990).
379. See generally Blair & Cotter, supra note 31 (devising an economic model of
optimal damages for use in intellectual property litigation and examining the ways in
which existing damages rules differ from the model).
380. See id- at 1587-88.
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dural Due Process Clause-a traditional view and a broad view.38 1 If
the broad view is correct, then the set of rights protected by the Due
Process Clause is virtually coextensive with the set covered by the
Remedy Clarification Acts. If the traditional view is correct, however,
then due process property rights account for some, but not all, of the
provisions under the federal laws. In the latter case, the question becomes whether it is permissible for Congress, under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit states from using property that is
not protected by the Due Process Clause.
In City of Boerne, which we discussed at some length in regard to
the Takings Clause portion,3 8 2 the Court held that Congress's enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends
only to remedying unconstitutional conduct and not to making "a substantive change in constitutional protections. '383 The Court acknowledged, however, that Congress may sometimes prohibit state conduct
that is not facially unconstitutional if such a prohibition is necessary to
remedy or prevent unconstitutional behavior, 3 " provided that there is
"a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
385
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.,
If the traditional view of property under the Due Process Clause is
correct, it is unlikely that Congress's incidental power under City of
Boerne would extend to holding states liable for violations of the
fringe rights under the federal intellectual property laws. Because the
provisions protecting these rights are separate from and independent
of the provisions protecting traditional rights, requiring different elements of proof to establish claims, Congress's prohibiting the states'
violation of these rights would not remedy or prevent violations of
traditional rights.3 86 Thus, the traditional view of property may be fatal to the Remedy Clarification Acts' attempt to hold states liable for
violations of rights such as moral rights and rights against trademark
dilution and some other forms of unfair competition.
The second potential objection to the Remedy Clarification Acts as
an exercise of power under the Due Process Clause deals with the
state of mind required to work a deprivation. Treating states the same
381. See supra text accompanying notes 280-94.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 224-41.
383. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 230-34 (discussing the Court's opinion).
384. See id. at 2163; see also supra text accompanying notes 235-39 (discussing the

Court's opinion).
385. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164; see also supra text accompanying notes 24041 (discussing the Court's opinion).
386. For example, trademark infringement requires a finding that the alleged infringer's use of the property causes a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
product or service, whereas trademark dilution requires no such finding. Conversely,
a mark owner must show that the mark is "famous" to prevail in a trademark dilution
action but not in a trademark infringement suit. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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as private individuals," 7 the Remedy Clarification Acts hold states lia-

ble for all intellectual property infringements regardless of the state
actor's intent to infringe. Based on our discussion of Zinermon, we
know that if the expansive view of the definition of deprivation is correct, many infringements of intellectual property by state actors,
whether negligent or intentional, are predictable enough to trigger
due process protection.3 s If, on the other hand, the narrow view of
what constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause is correct, then due process probably supports state liability for few negligent deprivations. 3 9 Given the difficulties in proving a state actor's
intent, however, holding a state liable for allegedly negligent deprivations arguably would serve to enforce liability for intentional deprivations. 390 Thus, this expansion of congressional power may be
permissible under City of Boerne.
The third problem with the Remedy Clarification Acts as an assertion of power to remedy violations of the Due Process Clause involves
a ripeness or exhaustion issue. The Remedy Clarification Acts subject
states to suit under the federal intellectual property laws as of the time
of infringement. Recall that if the expansive view of what constitutes a
deprivation under the Due Process Clause is correct, then many deprivations of property at the hands of a state are predictable enough generally to require predeprivation process.391 Thus, where a state uses
intellectual property without the owner's consent and without providing the required predeprivation safeguards, it violates the Constitution
at the time of infringement, and, arguably,
Congress is justified in sub392
jecting the state to suit at that point.
By contrast, according to the narrow view of what conduct works a
deprivation in the constitutional sense, predeprivation process would
be required in only a small percentage of cases-that is, in only those
cases involving conduct authorized by the state.393 Postdeprivation
process would suffice for intentional, unauthorized conduct, 3 and no
process at all would be required for negligent conduct causing depri387. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
388. See supra text accompanying note 332.

389. See supra text accompanying notes 325-27.
390. In some sense, even "innocent" infringements are intentional, to the extent
that the infringer could avoid infringing by conducting additional search activities. See
Blair & Cotter, supra note 31, at 1675-78.
391. See supra text accompanying note 322-24, 332.
392. The argument that an expansive view of Zizermon's predictability rule solves
the ripeness problem is somewhat tenuous. First, it does not explain how a state could
be made amenable to suit at the time of infringement where the state has provided
predeprivation procedures. Second, where the state omits to provide required
predeprivation procedures, the property owner has a due process right to compensa-

tory damages at the time of infringement only if she can prove that the failure to
provide the predeprivation safeguards caused the loss. Otherwise she would be entitled to only nominal damages under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264-67 (1978).
393. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 319-21, 349 and accompanying text.
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vations that were unauthorized by the state. 95 Where postdeprivation process is sufficient, the state does not effect a deprivation of
property without due process of law until it has been given an opportunity to afford an adequate postdeprivation remedy and has refused
to do so. 396 This postponement of a due process cause of action,
which essentially imposes a requirement on intellectual property owners similar to the ripeness requirement under takings law,397 means
that under the Constitution, an owner's right to bring a claim for violation of due process does not vest at the time of infringement, but
rather at some time in the future, if at all. Thus, under the narrow
view, Congress's effort to accelerate the amenability of states to suit
for infringement in federal court may be viewed as an attempt to expand procedural due process rights in contravention of the guidelines
established in City of Boerne.
The final difficulty with sustaining the Remedy Clarification Acts as
an exercise of congressional power under procedural due process
deals with the panoply of remedies afforded to intellectual property
owners against the states by virtue of the Acts. Under the federal
intellectual property laws, intellectual property owners may obtain injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and enhanced damages in
some circumstances.39 8 First, injunctive relief probably is not available as a matter of procedural due process prior to a state's use of
intellectual property if procedural due process requires only minimal
predeprivation procedures, 399 not an opportunity to contest the state's
use of the property or to get an injunction. Due process probably
entitles a property owner to an injunction against the state after the
infringement or deprivation has begun, but arguably not before the
state holds the postdeprivation hearing to determine liability.4"'
While courts have avoided Supremacy Clause implications in similar
situations by providing injunctive relief against the state actor under
Ex parte Young, this escape does not provide Congress with power to
enjoin the state itself.4 1 Second, in the previous section, we noted
395. See supra notes 296-303, 349 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
398. See supra Part IA.

399. See supra text accompanying notes 355-68.
400. While our research has found no cases addressing this issue, it seems unlikely
that a court would award retrospective compensation for a procedural due process
violation but then refuse to grant a request for injunctive relief to prevent the same
violation from occurring in the future.
401. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. The Court has suffered a great
deal of criticism in order to maintain its "fictional distinction between the state and its
officers." Chemerinsky, supra note 97, § 7.5, at 392. While the distinction between
suing a state officer and a state admittedly has little practical effect-most states statutorily agree to indemnify or otherwise protect their agents and thus have an interest
in controlling the agents' conduct-it frequently has provided a convenient escape
hatch from Eleventh Amendment immunity principles when they threaten to seri-
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that a state must provide compensation for a wrongful deprivation of
property in order to comport with procedural due process requirements, but that it may have some leeway to decide what that compensation should be."°) Arguably, this latter observation renders suspect
provisions that would require states to pay, at a minimum, a specified
amount of damages, such as the Patent Act's provision for damages
"in no event less than a reasonable royalty
.... "I Third, the enhanced damages provisions of the intellectual property laws, even if
restricted to cases of wilful infringement, 4" find virtually no support
in procedural due process jurisprudence. The most that is awarded to
right a due process wrong is compensatory damages. Although it may
be argued that the enhanced damages provisions are remedial and
preventative in nature under City of Boerne-because they remedy
and deter violations that otherwise would go unenforced where smallscale compensatory damages provide an inadequate incentive to seek
redress' 5-they might just as easily be characterized as substantive
provisions creating a right to additional damages. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence may inform Fourteenth Amendment interpretation here because, given that federal court judgments requiring a state
to make payments from state treasuries historically have been viewed
as hostile to the principles underlying the Eleventh Amendment," 6 an
award amounting to two or three times the compensatory damages
might seem particularly offensive.
B.

Substantive Due Process

In the previous sections we noted that under both the Takings and
Procedural Due Process theories, the Remedy Clarification Acts are
suspect because, among other reasons, they provide an intellectual
property owner aggrieved by a state's unauthorized use of her property with immediate access to federal court as of the time of infringeously undermine rule-of-law ideals. See Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts
§ 48, at 291 (4th ed. 1983); Vdzquez, supra note 101, at 1686.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 376-80.
403. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C § 504(b) (1994) ("'The copyright
owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of
the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.").
404. See supra notes 41, 63, 82 and accompanying text.
405. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 31, at 1619-22 (explaining that this is one of the
rationales for the enhanced damages provisions). It seems unlikely, however, that

Congress's passing references to the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate Report
accompanying the Remedy Clarification Acts, see S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094, can be viewed as findings that enhanced
damages may be necessary to deter otherwise unenforceable procedural due process
violations.
406. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (finding Illinois state
officials immune to § 1983 claims for damages); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (distinguishing an action for the recovery of money
from the state from the imposition of personal liability on defendant officials).
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ment. Most takings and procedural due process violations involving a
state's unauthorized use of intellectual property would not become
actionable until the owner has first sought a state remedy. 0 7 If substantive due process provides a source of power for the Acts, however,
this problem likely vanishes because exhaustion of state remedies generally is not required to establish a substantive due process
violation.4 °8

Substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to im-

plement them,' 4°9 or, put more famously, against government action
that "shocks the conscience.

'410

While substantive due process claims

for police or prison abuse abound,41 ' the Supreme Court has spoken
very rarely on the issue of substantive due process claims with respect
to property rights.412 Consequently, the circuits have divided on issues such as whether a loss of property engenders a substantive due

process claim at all, and
if it can, whether the property must be of a
41 3
"fundamental" nature.

407. See supra text accompanying notes 214-44, 375.
408. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961)).
409. Id. at 125 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
410. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 (1998).
411. See, e.g., id. at 1720 (holding that unintentional harm caused by police officer's
high-speed chase does not shock the conscience); City of Revere v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that an injured detainee has substantive
due process rights to medical treatment).
412. For a general discussion of substantive due process protection for property
rights, see Krotoszynski, supra note 265.
413. In considering whether substantive due process protection should extend to
property interests, many courts have wrestled with the issue of whether Williamson
County or Parrattprecludes a substantive due process claim in the property context.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 289, at 870-78 (discussing two ways in which courts have
used substantive due process); Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 572-74 (discussing
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Recall that in Williamson County the Court held that a takings claim is not ripe until the injured property owner has sought compensation through state channels, see supra text
accompanying notes 214-44, and that similarly in Parrattthe Court held that for some
deprivations of property, no due process violation occurs until the property owner has
sought and been denied an adequate postdeprivation remedy in state court. See supra
text accompanying note 375. Thus, the concern is that these holdings would be eviscerated if a property owner could bring a substantive due process claim immediately
upon injury to her property interest. While at first glance this concern seems valid, it
is probably overstated. With respect to takings claims, Williamson County would be
affected only slightly by a grant of substantive due process protection over property
rights. If substantive due process applies only to fundamental property rights, then, as
we shall see, its coverage is probably quite narrow, and the great majority of takings
claims would be unaffected. Even if it reaches non-fundamental property interests,
however, the arbitrary and capricious conduct required to sustain a substantive due
process claim usually is lacking where a state has taken property for a public purpose.
This latter observation makes the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' conflation of substantive due process and takings claims difficult to understand from a doctrinal standpoint. Moreover, as Krotoszynski has argued, this view "fail[s] to appreciate the
gravamen of a substantive due process action for the arbitrary deprivation of prop-
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During Lochner's brief hegemony, the Supreme Court held in
Truax v. Corrigan4 14 that a state's failure to protect a person's business
by refusing to enjoin employees from going on strike constituted a
substantive due process violation.415 In Truax, the Arizona legislature
had adopted a law restricting the state courts' authority to issue in-

junctions in labor disputes except in extreme circumstances of potential "irreparable injury to property. '4 16 When Truax was unable to
obtain an injunction ordering his employees to cease picketing, which
was causing him to lose profits, he filed suit alleging that the state of
Arizona failed to protect his property interest in his business.4 17 The
Court held for Truax, characterizing his business as a "fundamental"
property right and finding that Arizona's refusal to enjoin striking employees violated Truax's substantive due process rights.4 1
Arguably, given the substantial economic value of intellectual property, it should receive constitutional protection equivalent to that of
an individual's business. Moreover, providing substantive due process
protection for states' infringement of intellectual property may not be
erty. It is not the loss of property that justifies the claim, but rather the arbitrary and
irrational nature of the government's action." Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 572.
FI'mally, as we addressed under the takings portion of our analysis, a takings claim may
not be available to redress injuries to federal intellectual property rights because a
state's power of eminent domain does not extend to taking federally-protected property. See supra Part II.A. Substantive due process protection for property rights may
not limit substantially the Parrattholding either. If substantive due process protection
covers only fundamental property interests, it would carve only a small set of cases
out of Parratt'suniverse. In addition, if the expansive view of Zinernmon is correct as
we argued in the procedural due process section, see supra text accompanying notes
325-28, then Parrattalready has been limited where deprivations by state officials are
predictable.
In any event, a case handed down by the Supreme Court at the conclusion of its
most recent term may indicate a greater willingness on the part of the Court to recognize substantive due process protection for property interests in some circumstances.
At issue in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). was a federal statute
the effect of which was to require the plaintiff to fund benefits for retired miners who
had spent much of their careers working for other employers. Four members of the
Court found the statute to violate the Takings Clause. See id. at 2146-53 (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion). A fifth, Justice Kennedy, concluded that the Takings Clause was
not implicated but that the statute violated the plaintiffs right to substantive due process, due to its retroactive effect. See id. at 2154-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). The four dissenting justices agreed with Justice
Kennedy that the proper inquiry was whether the law was "fundamentally unfair or
unjust," and that if so it "would 'deprive' Eastern of 'property, without due process of
law,"' in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2164 (Breyer, J.. dissenting) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). The dissent nevertheless concluded that the statute was
not fundamentally unfair or unjust. See id. at 2164-67. Given the fractured nature of
the decision, however, the question of whether it heralds a return to meaningful substantive due process protection for property rights remains to be seen.
414. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
415. See id. at 327-30.
416. Id. at 322.
417. See id. at 322-23.
418. See id. at 329-30.
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as offensively Lochnerian as the Court's protection of Truax's business. Truax involved a justifiable policy decision by a state legislature
not to enjoin striking workers in labor disputes. By contrast, in the
intellectual property context, infringement often occurs at the hands
of one or more state actors, and no legislative policy is evident, unless
it is the policy that the state does not want to pay for the use of intellectual property like everyone else.
Thus, under Truax, a convincing case exists for substantive due process protection of intellectual property rights. As Ronald Krotoszynski observes, however, Truax may no longer be good law:
Truax-like most of the other decisions of the Lochner era-had
simply disappeared from the Supreme Court's repertoire by the
early 1940s. Unlike some vestiges of the Lochner period, however,
Truax did not reappear in the 1960s. Indeed, over the last seventyfive years, the lower federal courts also have failed to make much
use of Truax. No lower federal court has ever directly enforced
Truax's holding that the substantive aspect of the Due Process
Clause limits the states' ability to enact legislation that adversely
affects "fundamental" property interests. 19
In one of the few Supreme Court cases on this issue since Truax, the
Court ruled in HarrahIndependent School District v. Martin4 20 that a
school board's refusal to renew a teacher's contract did not rise to the
level of a substantive due process violation because the teacher's interest in employment was not similar enough to interests in "'basic
matters of procreation, marriage, and family life.' ' 42 1 The Court held
that the school board had acted rationally, which was all that was required in the absence of a more significant interest.4 22
In addition to the Supreme Court's approach, the circuit courts of
appeals have developed various approaches to the issue of substantive
due process protection for property interests. For example, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that substantive
due process protection exists only for "fundamental" rights. 2 3 At
419. Krotoszynski, supra note 265, § 2.10, at 566-67 (footnotes omitted); see also
Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 265, at 40 n.13 (stating that Truax is "no longer good
law and reflect[s] discarded theories of substantive due process.")
420. 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per curiam).
421. See Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979) (quoting
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976)).
422. See id. at 198-201.
423. See Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv. Employees v. Town Bd., 31 F.3d 1191,
1196 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "simple, state-law contractual rights, without more,
are [not] worthy of substantive due process protection" because "[s]ubstantive due
process protects only those interests that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969)); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("Because employment rights are state-created rights and are not
'fundamental' rights created by the Constitution, they do not enjoy substantive due
process protection."); Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Statecreated rights such as [petitioner's] contractual right to promotion do not rise to the
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least in the Third and Sixth Circuits, however, the outcomes of some
cases indicate that the pronounced rule may not be a strict one and
that some protection exists for non-fundamental property interests injured by arbitrary and capricious acts of state officials.4 24 The Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, has declined to extend any substantive due

process protection to property interests unless the plaintiff also claims
a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee, such as a violation of

the Takings Clause. 4" Similarly, the Ninth Circuit essentially treats a
state's injury to property interests as giving rise to a takings issue,
even if the property is not taken for a public purpose. 2 6
Even under the most liberal of these standards, there is substantial

incongruence in viewing state uses of intellectual property as violations of the substantive due process guarantee. First, it is unlikely that

intellectual property is a "fundamental" property interest in modem
constitutional parlance. A broad reading of fundamental property
rights under substantive due process would render Seminole Tribe virtually a dead letter,4 27 contrary to the ostensible intent of the current
Supreme Court. In addition, as Krotoszynski asserts, Truax's broad
definition of fundamental property rights "is untenable, for it would
prevent legislative bodies from modifying-even at the margins-a
raft of statutes that affect completely fungible property interests." 4"
Krotoszynski argues that "incommensurability" should serve as the
linchpin in the analysis of whether a right is fundamental, 429 giving
level of 'fundamental' interests protected by substantive due process. Routine statecreated contractual rights are not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[.]' (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986) (quoting Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969)))); Reich v.
Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that an "interest in avoiding
delay in the receipt of payment of a bill for professional services rendered" does not
invoke substantive due process protection after discussing a variety of cases suggesting that substantive due process is narrow in scope and encompasses mainly constitutionally-created rights).
424. See Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 577-80 (discussing circuit court cases holding that a substantive due process claim would stand in zoning and land use context).
425. See Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989). Although its view is
not completely clear, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also seems to reject substantive due process protection for property rights. Recently, it summarily dismissed a
substantive due process claim in a copyright case by stating that '[in modem judicial
history, substantive due process has had nothing to do with property rights claims, and
we are not about to extend this judicially-created doctrine simply to assure private
parties of a remedy against unconsenting states in federal court." Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504, 511 (5th Cir. 1998).
426. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Apparently, the Ninth Circuit prefers to indulge the view that the Takings Clause
encompasses takings of property for private purposes, despite the clause's unmistakable textual limitation to takings for public purposes, rather than recognize a substantive due process claim for the former. See id. at 1324-25.
427. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
428. Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 586.
429. See id. at 586-88.
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reputation as an example of a would-be fundamental property right.430
Interestingly, if this approach were accepted, reputation-based intellectual property rights might be protected under a substantive due
process theory, whereas the more traditional intellectual property provisions would not be.4 3 '

Second, even if substantive due process protection reaches both
fundamental and non-fundamental property interests, it may be difficult to establish that state officials act arbitrarily and capriciously-or
shock the conscience-when they negligently or even recklessly use
intellectual property without the owner's consent. Applied to nonfundamental rights, the standard is very deferential to state governments and suggests that substantive
due process shields against only
4 32
egregious state misconduct.

For these reasons, it seems that few instances of state uses of intellectual property would amount to substantive due process violations.
Accordingly, to permit Congress to subject states to comprehensive
liability for all violations of federal intellectual property law under the
substantive due process clause would be to let the tail wag the dog.
Thus, as an exercise of congressional power to remedy substantive due
process rights, the Remedy Clarification Acts likely would fail to meet
City of Boerne's requirement that there be congruence between the
means and the
ends of legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
43 3
Amendment.

The aforementioned analytical objections to sustaining the Remedy
Clarification Acts under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce procedural or substantive due process guarantees may provide concrete support for the vague dicta in the Seminole Tribe decision suggesting that, when the case presents itself, the Court might
find that the acts exceed Congress's power. As noted above, Justice
Stevens argued in his dissent that the majority's opinion "prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions
430. See id. at 590-607. Of course, in order to find a property right in reputation,
Krotoszynski had to distinguish Paul, which, as we saw in the previous section, traditionally has been read for precisely the counter proposition. See supra note 289 and
accompanying text. Thus, Krotoszynski argues that Paul, being a procedural due process case, does not apply to substantive due process cases, and alternatively that the
revisionist interpretation of Paul is correct. See Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 60002.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 280-94. Moreover, even under a slightly
broader conception of fundamental property rights that includes more commensurable property (such as real property), it may be that intellectual property would be
deemed insufficiently fundamental, lacking land's place in Anglo-American law.
432. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1720 (1998) (holding
that only intentional harm caused by a high-speed police chase implicates substantive
due process); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126-30 (1992) (ruling
that the city's failure to provide safety in the workplace and its alleged "deliberate
indifference" to employees' safety did not warrant substantive due process
protection).
433. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
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against States, [including] those sounding in copyright and patent law
. .. 434 and that "[a]s federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
cases arising under these federal laws, the majority's conclusion that
the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued under them
in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of
[these] laws have no remedy. ' 435 In a footnote, the majority responded that "Justice Stevens' statement is misleadingly overbroad,' 436 but the reasons it gave are revealing. First, the Court noted
"that several avenues remain open for ensuring state compliance with
federal law," and gave injunctive relief under Ex parte Young as the
primary example.4 37 Thus, the Court failed to answer Justice Ste-

vens's apparent concern regarding the availability of a remedy other
than prospective injunctive relief for intellectual property owners.
Second, the Court stated that the federal intellectual property laws
have not been widely understood to apply to the states,4 38 despite the
fact that the Remedy Clarification Acts explicating Congress's intent
to hold states liable had been passed a few years before.
Certainly the Seminole Tribe majority did not intend for the footnote to address the matter in exhaustive detail. Still, given that the
Court had just reaffirmed Congress's power to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, the absence of any mention of
this power with respect to protecting intellectual property rights is
rather conspicuous. Thus, while the dicta in Seminole Tribe may not
elucidate the Court's complete view, it presents a first impression, in
accord with our findings here, that Congress has not succeeded in
making states liable in federal court for violations of federal intellectual property laws.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES

The foregoing discussion suggests that the Remedy Clarification
Acts cannot be sustained by virtue of Congress's power to enforce the
provisions of the Takings or Due Process Clauses and thus, under
Seminole Tribe, are unconstitutional. Rather than simply strike them
down, a court may consider severing the constitutionally offensive
provisions. The general rule is that a court may sever an unconstitutional provision from other portions of a federal statute, if it concludes
that Congress would have preferred for these other portions to remain
in force rather than have the entire statute invalidated.439 Thus, if the
only obstacle to upholding the acts is the problem of enhanced damages and injunctive relief, then arguably the court could sever certain
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1& at 77 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 72 n.16.
Id. at 72 n.16 (emphasis added).
See id. at 72 n.16.
See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 n.15 (1985).
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provisions of the Patent and Copyright Remedy Clarification Actsspecifically, portions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) and 296(b); 17 U.S.C.
§§ 501(a), 511(b), 910(a), and 911(g)(2); and 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(b) and
2570(b)-that purport to render the states susceptible to remedies
other than compensatory damages. Likewise, if the acts exceed Congress's power because the rights protected under the acts are broader
in scope than the property interests protected by procedural or substantive due process, a court could sever the provisions purporting to
prohibit the states from using property not covered by either of these
constitutional guarantees.
Conforming the acts to the other limits or requirements of the Takings Clause or Due Process Clause cannot be achieved simply by deleting additional provisions, and the only way to salvage them would
be to construe them as applying only in instances in which the state
has effected a taking for public use or a violation of due process that is
actionable in federal court. For example, one would have to read
§ 511(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides that "[a]ny state ...
shall not be immune ...from suit in Federal court ... for a violation
of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by sections 106 to 119,,44o as meaning, in effect, that a state shall not be
immune from suit for an act that can be characterized as a taking for
public use or as a violation of due process.
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned against "rewrit[ing] a
...law to conform it to constitutional requirements,14 4 1 it also has
stated that "a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it."' 442 Thus,
even when a statute is challenged on First Amendment grounds (thus
raising the possibility of invalidation on the grounds of overbreadth),
the Court will "impose a limiting construction," so as to render the
statute constitutional, "if it is 'readily susceptible' to such a construction" 44 3-that is, when "the text or other source of congressional intent identifie[s] a clear line that" the Court may draw.4 44 The
legislative history of the Remedy Clarification Acts suggests that Congress would have preferred subjecting the states to liability to the extent permissible under the Constitution, over permitting them to
continue avoiding liability altogether.4 45 Moreover, the construction
necessary to achieve this result-limiting the applicability of the acts
to those cases in which a taking or due process violation has occurred,
440. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994).
441. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (quoting Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
442. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502.
443. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2350 (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484
U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
444. Id. at 2351.
445. See S.Rep. No. 102-280, at 8-9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
3094-95.
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or in which the state has engaged in a non-core governmental function
(assuming that Parden still retains any vitality)" 6-would not involve
a court in the extensive redrafting of the type the Supreme Court has
condemned." 7
If a court were to decide that the acts are not severable, Congress
still could attempt to enforce some intellectual property rights against
the states in two ways. First, Congress could confer upon the state
courts concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims. If the forum-allocation theory is correct, the Supreme
Court then could exercise appellate review of the resulting state-court
judgments." Second, rather than rewrite the intellectual property
laws to apply to the states to the extent permissible under the Constitution, it appears that Congress could enforce some intellectual property rights by abrogating sovereign immunity from § 1983 claims and
allowing intellectual property rights to be protected under § 1983 like
other federal rights." 9 Section 1983 establishes a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law, violates any
right under the federal Constitution or federal law.45 Although
§ 1983, like the Remedy Clarification Acts, probably would be constitutionally defective as an attempt to subject states to suit for all violations of the federal intellectual property laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress almost certainly would have the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under § 1983 to redress at least those unauthorized uses of intellectual property that violate the
Constitution.45 '
Finally, if Congress fails to subject the states to suit in federal court
under any legislation, intellectual property owners aggrieved by state
446. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (discussing Parden).
447. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (declining to impose limiting construction upon

provisions of Communications Decency Act penalizing "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, where doing so would involve gross speculation as to the form the
statutory language would have taken had Congress been more sensitive to First
Amendment issues); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 479 (1995) (declining to impose limiting construction upon statute imposing honoraria ban upon certain government employees, where doing so would require the
Court to "correctly identify" the "nexus between the speaker's official duties and
either the subject matter of the speaker's expression or the identity of the payor" that
"Congress would have adopted in a more limited .

.

. ban"). But see Trade-Mark

Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1879) (invalidating in its entirety earlier federal trademark
legislation, on ground that act purported to regulate trademarks used in both intrastate and in interstate commerce).
448. See supra notes 102-03, 106 and accompanying text.
449. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), the Court held that Congress did
not sufficiently indicate an intent to subject states to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
450. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
451. See generally Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978) (allowing plaintiffs who
have prevailed in civil rights cases to recover attorneys' fees against states in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding
that Congress can subject states to suit in federal court for claims arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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action still may have a few options. First, where the state's unauthorized use of the property effects a taking 452 or triggers due process,
they may be able to pursue an action in state court for compensation.4 53 The state court judgment would be subject to the appellate
review of the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the
judgment comports with the requirements of the Takings Clause or
the Due Process Clause.4 54 Second, if the state's unauthorized use of
the intellectual property is ongoing, an intellectual property owner
probably can bring an action in federal court against the state actor
for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young 455 or for prospective mone452. If our preemption analysis is wrong, see supra notes 168-213 and accompanying text, but our ripeness or authorization analysis is correct, see supra notes 214-44,
245-62 and accompanying text, then it is possible for the Remedy Clarification Acts to
be unconstitutional but for some state uses of intellectual property to qualify as takings for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment.
453. See supra Parts II-III. In theory, it may be possible for an aggrieved intellectual property owner to file an infringement action against the state in state court, even
when the state's use does not rise to the level of a taking or a violation of the Due
Process Clause. As noted above, some Eleventh Amendment theorists argue that the
Amendment expresses a principle of forum allocation rather than absolute immunity;
according to this theory, a state may choose not to litigate in federal court but cannot
opt out of a state forum. See supra notes 102-03 and 106. As Vdlzquez notes, however,
this theory is difficult to square with some of the language found in Seminole Tribe
and other recent Supreme Court case law. See Vizquez, supra note 101, at 1702-03.
Moreover, even if the theory is correct, it provides no relief with regard to patent and
copyright actions-both of which Congress has expressly chosen to allocate to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994)-absent an
amendment to this jurisdictional statute. At most, a forum allocation theorist might
argue that the states lack immunity from actions arising under the Lanham Act, over
which the states have concurrent jurisdiction, when those actions are filed in state
court. To our knowledge, no litigation has yet tested this theory.
454. See supra notes 102-03, 106 and accompanying text.
455. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1908). Injunctive relief under Ex
parte Young is probably available to enjoin ongoing, unauthorized uses of intellectual
property by state actors-unless those uses amount to takings for a public purpose,
see supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text-despite two recent cases limiting the
scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine. First, in Seminole Tribe the Court ruled that a
party may not invoke the Ex parte Young doctrine where Congress has a "detailed
remedial scheme" in place because doing so would defeat Congress's intent by exposing the state official to all potential injunctive remedies rather than only those provided in the statute. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996). In Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Tribe claimed ownership of the "submerged lands and bed of
Lake Coeur d'Alene and of the various navigable rivers and streams that form part of
its water system." 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (1997). The Tribe alleged that these lands
were located within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation as established
by an Executive Order of November 8, 1873. See id. The Court's opinion was splintered, but a majority found that the Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply. See id. at
2043. The majority first explained that
[t]o interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to proceed in every case
where prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle, reaffirmed just last Term in Seminole
Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a
federal court's federal-question jurisdiction.
Id. at 2034.
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tary relief under Edelman v. Jordan.4 56 Fimally, a federal infringement
Then, despite the federal issue of interpreting the Executive Order that established
the Reservation's boundaries, the Court went on to characterize the Tribe's claim as
"the functional equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty
interests." Id. at 2040. Thus, the Court concluded that the relief requested was more
like "'the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment [than] that permitted
under Ex parte Young. .

. ."'

Id. (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667

(1974)). Read narrowly on its facts, Coeur d'Alene could be interpreted as establishing a limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine similar to the Thibodaux abstention
doctrine, under which federal courts usually abstain in diversity cases involving a significant state interest that is "intimately involved" with the "sovereign prerogative" of
the state government, such as eminent domain. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). Under this view, Coeur d'Alene probably
does not present a substantial obstacle to obtaining Ex parte Young relief in most
cases, including intellectual property infringement actions. Indeed, this is probably
the correct view, given that in the term before Coeur d'Alene was decided the same
Court indicated in Seminole Tribe that Ex parte Young relief would be available to
remedy state violations of federal statutes such as the Copyright Act. See Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16. A broader view of Coeur d'Alene might be read in conjunction with Seminole Tribe's limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine. This reading
can be seen as the beginning of a trend of chipping away at the presumed availability
of Ex parte Young injunctive relief against state officers. If the latter view is correct,
the availability of Ex parte Young relief in the intellectual property and other contexts
could be affected.
456. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). If a federal action against a state
actor for injunctive or prospective monetary relief for the ongoing, unauthorized use
of intellectual property proceeds to judgment before a state-court action for retrospective compensation and is successful, the judgment may have collateral estoppel
effect against the state in the state-court action in limited circumstances, thus effectively conferring whatever real or perceived benefit a federal forum provides with
respect to the restrospective, as well as the prospective, relief. If the state's use of
intellectual property is characterized as a taking, then the property owner has no right
to enjoin the state official from effecting the taking under the Takings Clause. See
supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. Otherwise, a plaintiff requesting retrospective relief in state court may have a good-faith basis for asserting offensive mutual
collateral estoppel on the basis of the prior Er parte Young or Edelman judgment as
to the issue of whether the state actor violated the Constitution. "Federal law, not
state law, determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment." 10 Christopher J. Miller, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure 361 (3d ed. 1991) (citing Shoup v.
Bell & Howell, 872 F.2d 1178, 1179 (4th Cir. 1989)). In United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 161 (1984), the Supreme Court cited several reasons why nonmutual collateral estoppel should not apply against the federal government, including that the government is often involved in issues of great public importance and that the
government considers factors such as limited government resources and overloaded
court dockets in deciding whether to appeal an adverse judgment. Similarly, in Hercules Carriers,Inc. v. FloridaDepartment of Transportation,the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply collateral estoppel against a state agency, concluding that "the
rationale outlined by the Supreme Court in Mendoza for not applying nonmutual
collateral estoppel against the government is equally applicable to state governments." 768 F.2d 1558, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985). An important factor in Hercules Carriers was that different state agencies were involved in the two actions. Thus, the court
found "that the[ ] two agencies had different functions and interests and should not be
considered privies to one another for purposes of collateral estoppel." Id. at 1580.
Collateral estoppel was applied, however, against a state agency in federal court on
the basis of a state court judgment in Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990), in which the court distinguished
Hercules Carrierson the ground that "the same state agency ...litigated and lost the
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action may be available against the state actor in his individual capacity.45 7 Even if qualified immunity applies in the suit against the individual, it would not bar a claim involving a violation of clearly
established law.4 58 None of these options will be of much use, however, where the actor's use of the intellectual property does not violate the Constitution, has occurred in the past instead of being
ongoing, and the state actor is judgment-proof and not covered by
state indemnification.
CONCLUSION

While modern states for the most part no longer subject artists and

inventors to the types of penalties described in opening paragraph of
this Article, the preceding analysis demonstrates that, as we approach
the close of the twentieth century, the individual states within the

United States often can subject them to the milder but nonetheless
vexatious practice of refusing to pay them for the use of their creative
works. Because many uses of intellectual property on the part of state
actors do not constitute violations of the Takings or Due Process

Clauses, and because the remedies required by these Clauses are fairly
modest in comparison with those afforded by the federal intellectual
property laws, any attempt by Congress to hold the states accountable
in federal court to the same extent as private infringers probably exceeds its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. And

although some avenues for relief against state infringements still remain possible after Seminole Tribe-includingthe abrogation of sovereign immunity from § 1983 claims, the availability of prospective
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, and suits against state actors in
issue in the state courts[,] [t]he agency had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and
the identical issue was actually litigated and actually decided." Benjamin, 708 F. Supp.
at 573. The court also noted that "It]he agency was aware that this action was pending
at the time the state actions were decided, and so had a strong incentive to appeal the
adverse decisions." Id. On this reasoning, a state-court plaintiff suing for compensation for the state's use of her intellectual property may be able to argue for the application of collateral estoppel against the state on the basis of a federal judgment, if the
state was the real party in interest in the federal action against the state officer, especially where the state-court action had been filed prior to the federal action to give the
state incentive to litigate the federal action fully and to appeal the adverse judgment.
457. See Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits against officers in their individual capacities); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 400 (stating that "if the suit is against an officer for
money damages where the relief would come from the officer's own pocket, there is
no Eleventh Amendment bar even though the conduct was part of the officer's official
duties" and that "[t]he state's choice to indemnify the officier [sic] would not convert
the suit from individual to official capacity." (footnote omitted)).
458. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (articulating the immunity
rule that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known").
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their individual capacities-these measures may be insufficient to
remedy or deter many unauthorized uses of intellectual property on
the part of the states. With the apparent blessing of the modern-day
Supreme Court, modern states arguably remain largely free to follow
the practice-not altogether foreign to their more autocratic forebears-of imposing upon the creators of intellectual works in a manner that, if engaged in by the rest of us, would subject us to liability.

